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PART II
THE NAVAL PARTICIPANT IN ECONOMIC WARFARE
CHAPTER III

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INTERNAL CONFLICT
INTRODUCTION

This Chapter deals with economic warfare in the early phases of
an insurgency. The function of the United States Navy in this
context is primarily one of protecting the lives and property of
United States citizens. Their property may be jeopardized by
economic warfare practiced either by the insurgents or by the de jure
government of the state divided by internal conflict. The economic
warfare posture of the United States is basically that of a third
party, parrying the economic warfare thrusts of contestants in civil
strife. Four Situations are presented.
Situation 1 deals with the critical intelligence problem in economic warfare and the special role in fact gathering to be performed
by naval surface units. Considered here are alternatives for obtaining
intelligence, port control by the territorial sovereign and special
legal problems associated with visits to foreign ports and approaches
by naval units to foreign coasts and blockading squadrons. A
description of the Organization of Am(}rican States, the origins of
the Organization and its functions, appears in Footnote 25.
Situation ~ develops distinctions between "closure" of an insurgent port and "blockade." Rights of the de jure government and
the insurgents to visit, search, and seize vessels of "bystander"
states in territorial waters of the divided state are considered.
In Situation 3 legal problems are examined pertinent to armed
landings to protect lives and property when the local government
either cannot or will not extend this protection. The diverse definitions and opinions concerning "intervention" in international law
are examined principally here, although in Situation 1 the "intervention" problem is introduced with major emphasis upon the
views of Western Hemispheric states.
Because "intervention" claims are frequently advanced in response
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to economic warfare, "intervention" receives distributive treatment
in this book. The varying perspectives concerning intervention
are best grasped by relating the sundry definitions to concrete
cases. However, the discussion in Situation 3 is intended to provide
a general background £or the discussions in situations that follow.
"Self-Defense'~ and "Collective Self-Defense" arguments are dealt
with in detail in Chapter IV, Situation 6.
The narrow but complex and important problems o£ requisitions
and contributions during insurgency are considered in Situation .q,.
Since few treaties or conventions dealing with requisitions or contributions apply specifically to these practices during insurgencies
before recognition o£ a state o£ belligerency, naval officers have
solved these problems for generations by the application o£ good
judgment and "common sense" coupled with minor applications o£
force when required. The Discussion suggests legal arguments which
might be advanced should the occasion demand it.
A. NAVAL RECONNAISSANCE IN CIVIL DISTURBANCE
Situation I

The Partido Democratico Secreto (PDS) led by Salvaje, is
declared illegal in Nueva (see map) by the constitutionally elected
and generally recognized government o£ President Cortez. Desultory
fighting has occurred bet,veen Cortez and PDS forces in Ewaltacion.
Our Charge d'Affaires in Dolores, the Nuevan capital, reports
our Consul £rom Ewaltacion is in Dolores and has not been permitted
to return by Cortez troops. vVire communications bet,veen Dolores
and Ewaltacion are broken. There is no radio contact between our
Ministry and the Consulate. No other diplomatic missions in Dolores
have contact with their consulates in Ewaltacion. The Nuevan Foreign Office states Cortez has received a message in which Salvaje
threatens to destroy the lumberyards in Ewaltacion unless Cortez
troops are withdrawn, the PDS reinstated, and Salvaje is taken
into the Cortez government as Premier. Our Charge d'Affaires
believes Cortez will reject these terms.
A Buick dealer who drove £rom Ewaltacio11. to Dolores reports
three Cortez soldiers have been killed and ten United States citizens
have taken refuge in the Consulate. He also reports rumors in
Ewaltacion that officers and crews o£ Almirante Medina and Almirante St"don1~a , Nuevan destroyers, anchored in Ewaltacion harbor,
have defected. These are the major combat units o£ the Nuevan
Navy.
Early this morning, Cortez declared all communications, except
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diplomatic dispatches, to and from Nueva, blocked effective immediately. He also decleared a "blockade" of Ewaltacion.
The 1umberyards in E waltacion are owned by the Virginia Pine
Products Corporation, a Virginia Corporation, and Union Box and
Bagging Company, an Illinois Corporation. These are not guaranteed investments under the Act for International Development
of 1961.
The lumber presently stored or seasoning in the yards is valued
at $35,000,000.00. The owners intend to sell this lumber in the
United States.
U.S.S. M ontgorn,e ry (cruiser), U.S.S. Staton (destroyer) and
U .S.S. Parsons (destroyer) are at sea and can reach E waltacion
within three hours. The 5th Battalion, 6th Marine Division, with
airlift capability, is at Coloso, Antioka, and can reach Ewaltacion
within five hours.
Nueva and Antioka are members of the United Nations and of
the Organization of American States. They are parties to the Rio
Pact.
Our Secretary of State and our Minister to Nueva (on leave in
the United States) are in conference. Both are inclined to the view
that a naval unit should be sent to Ewaltacion. This unit will determine effectiveness of the "blockade" declared by Cortez, the strength
of the revolt by the PDS, and Salvaje's willingness and ability to
protect American citizens and their property in Ewaltacion.
You have been given the situation by telephone and are to be at
the State Department at 1400 (within approximately one hour)
to assist the Secretary and Minister in preparing a recommendation
to the President. What "legal" questions should you raise for considera tion at the conference~
Discussion : Situation 1

Tentative Factual Analysis
The revolt is ill organized and uncoordinated and probably prematurely induced. Salvaje has turned to economic warfare as a
primary policy device by threatening to sabotage a major product
held for export. There is no basis for a judgment concerning his
immediate or ultimate plans.
However, plausible assumptions may be made about his threat to
destroy the property. (1) He probably seeks to gain time to attract
foreign support and acquire equipment. (2) He wishes to publicize
repressive action by the Cortez government. To do this he is creating
a situation which might be presented to an international security
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organization. ( 3) He may intend to weaken the Cortez government
by: (a) destroying a product which, if sold, will bring dollars into
the country; and (b) demonstrating its inability to protect the
property of foreign nationals.
The revolt is in a critical stage. It might be quickly crushed or
spread rapidly depending upon the attitudes of other states.

Necessity for Information
The United States needs immediate information concerning the
strength and intentions of the Cortez and Salvaje factions. Information concerning the Cortez forces can be obtained from our Charge
d'Affaires in Dolores through the usual diplomatic channels. But
Exaltam:on has been cut off by land. Wire and radio communications
with it have been broken.
Military action may be necessary to protect the lives and property
of our citizens in Exaltacion. This action should not be taken unless
a real peril to lives and property of American citizens is discovered.
Action then should be taken only if the Cortez or Salvaje factions
are either incapable of discharging or are unwilling to discharge
the international obligation of Nueva to protect aliens and their
property. The necessity, timing and scope of possible military action
necessitates developing a reliable intelligence source in Exaltacion.

Establishing an Intelligence Source
An intelligence source would be created preferably by persuading
President Cortez to allow our Consul to return to his post and from
there communicate 'vith the Ministry in Dolores. An argument for
free access of the Consul to Exaltacion may be based upon a treaty
of friendship and commerce between Nueva and the United States.
An argument may also be based upon the customary international
law of diplomatic immunities. We might rely upon this customary
law to insist upon free movement of our diplomatic personnel
between Dolores and Exaltacion and communication by wire or
radio between our Ministry and the Consulate.
Such arguments are likely to carry little weight w bile the
emergency is acute. The Cortez government will attempt to isolate
the rebels from all external communication and possible assistance.
Since the insurgents will try to establish outside contacts, it may
be possible to wait until this happens. In the interim, American
lives may be lost or property destroyed. These things might be
prevented by prompt action.
Clandestine agents may be infiltrated into Exaltacion or contact
may be made with clandestine agents already there.
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A communications team may be airlifted to Exaltacion to establish
a communications base. But such a team is difficult to protect and
control. An incident might result precipitating premature United
States action.
The most reasonable alternative is to dispatch a United States
naval unit to Exaltacion. The unit should possess sufficient force for
its protection. Its presence will provide a bargaining element in
negotiations with Cortez to permit return of the Consul and reopening communications. It will deter interference by disloyal
Nuevan naval units in the event airborne landings in Exaltacion are
necessary and provide the fire support such landings may require.

0 ontrol by a Territorial Sovereign
Over Entry of Foreign lVarship8
The territorial sovereign (in this situation the Cortez government) is entitled to close a port; designate times when entries may
be made and the time of sojourn; and require the departure on
short notice of either a merchant or war vessel. There is no right
of innocent anchorage analogous to the right of innocent passage
through territorial waters. The United States has taken the position that it may require withdrawal of a foreign vessel of war from
one of its ports "'\Yithin six hours even before expiration of the
previously agreed time of sojourn. 1
There is no minimum time limit for requiring a departure, subject to delays necessary to refuel, assemble the cre,v, and obtain a
pilot and tug. The time should be determined by the type and
condition of the vessel, its preparedness to put to sea, and conditions
in the port.
A warship, today, poses less of a. threat as a base for shore
bombardment "'\vhile in port than when at sea. But these vessels, and
merchant vessels as well, may serve as vehicles for prepositioned
nuclear explosives, missile guidance devices, radar jamming equipment and biological warfare munitions. These hazards justify
summary and decisive action. The port control laws of all ma.j or
states provide administrative machinery for port closures.2
This potential control over its ports is nevertheless seldom exercised by a littoral state except during warfare or under special
circumstances such as those prevailing in the Panama Canal Zone
1 A discussion of the problem appears in U.S. Naval War College, International Law Topics and Discuss·ions, 1914, 35-67.

2 The power of the President to control United States ports is set forth in 50
U.S. Code 191 and the regulations of the Coast Guard pursuant to this authority
appear in 33 CFR 6.01-1 et seq.
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or In nuclear testing areas. 3 Active patrols at sea are likely to
detect suspected vessels. These can be prevented :from entering a
port.
Accordingly, the only situation in which significant conflict develops concerning the visit o:£ a 'varship to a :foreign port is during
civil strife, as in Nueva, 'vhen the visit is to a port under possible
rebel control and de facto control o£ the port by the de jure government is questionable. This problem is explored in greater detail in
Situation f2. Ho"~ever, it is in the incipient stages o:£ an insurgency
that an information "blackout" is likely to occur. I:£ a naval reconnaissance is undertaken, adequate attention must be given to avoiding an issue o:£ authority o:£ the de jure government over the port.
"While it is customary to obtain consent o:£ the territorial sovereign
prior to a call by a naval unit at a port 'vithin its territory, 4 there
is no international legal requirement that consent be obtained in
advance o:£ the visit.
I:£ consent by the Cortez government 'vas sought by the United
States in advance, the Cortez government might assent to the visit.
The assent might be granted on the ground the presence of an
American warship would be viewed as a gesture o:£ moral support
:for the regime. Presence o:£ an American 'varship might also influence the loyalty o:£ the officers and crews o:£ N uevan vessels at
Exaltacion in :favor o:£ the de j-ure government. Information o:£ the
rebel plans might be obtained :from the American intelligence efforts.
On the other hand, Cortez has declared a "blockade" o:£ Exaltacion. It is well settled that a :foreign warship has no right to
pass an effective blockade. Such a vessel may be allowed ingress
and egress subject to conditions imposed by the blockade commander.5
While it remains to be determined whether the "blockade'~ declared
by Cortez is a blockade and is effective, his declaration may indicate
his intention to :forbid entry to the port.
It is undesirable to present at this stage o:£ the insurgency the
issue o:£ control by the Cortez government over Exaltacion ... Cortez
might be placed in a position in ·which he would be obligated, :for
The regulations for the Canal Zone and the Nuclear testing areas in the
Pacific are established by the Governor of the Canal Zone and the Department
of the Navy respectively, pursuant to power delegated by the President under
50 U.S. Code 191.
4 I Hyde, International Law, 583 (1947) ; II Hackworth, Digest, 408 (1941).
The procedure is not followed when a warship is driven into port by weather
or unseaworthiness. Ports open to merchant vessels are open to warships.
5 These conditions normally will exclude the carriage of passengers, supplies
and dispatches. See II Moore, Digest, 571 (1906).
3
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the sake o£ consistency, to withhold consent. It is desirable to avoid
also the issue o£ "intervention" 'vhich might be raised i£ the reconnaissance should be made in defiance o£ the wishes o£ the Cortez
regime.
It is arguable that the purpose o£ the visit, which extends beyond
a mere courtesy call, places a special obligation upon the United
States to secure the permission o£ a government which may still
be in effective control o£ a port. But international custom upon
which such an argument might be based is slight.

United States Position Concerning Advance
0 onsent to a N a·val Reconnaissance
In 1901, Venezuela protested the entry o£ U.S.S. Scorpion into the
"closed" port o£ Santa Catalina. The Venezuelan note alleged: 6
An officer in uniform went ashore * * * and returned on board
acco1npanied by a gentleman called Boynton, an employee o£
the company which has its agency at said port, and * * * no
explanation was given £or this flagrant violation o£ the usual
formalities.
Santa Catalina is on the Orinoco River. A Venezuelan law required governmental consent £or a foreign warship to enter closed
ports on "scientific" missions.
United States Minister Loomis replied in part: 7
* * * I was not aware that there was a law in force closing
the Orinoco River to the public vessels o£ a friendly nation
bent on the peaceful and inoffensive mission o£ seeking information from its nationals engaged in lawful business on the banks
o£ that stream.
It is true that when it was desired to do certain scientific
work for the benefit o£ navigation and the shipping o£ all
nations at the banks o£ the Orinoco and San Juan rivers, the
formal permission o£ the Venezuelan Government was asked;
but in these cases it was deemed necessary to keep a war vessel
in Venezuelan waters for many 'veeks, and the officers and men
on these scientific expeditions were a.t work in small boats
t aking many observations and measurements, so it was only
natural that their presence for so long a period o£ time and
their activity should be explained in the form o£ asking permission £or the performance o£ the task in question.
The Scorpion, as I understand it, recently made a very quick
trip to Santa Catalina and immediately returned to the coast.
a Ibid., 566.
7

Ibid.
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Her visit was o£ course wholly inoffensive in ch aracter and
devoid o£ significance in any other sense than the one I h ave
the honor to indicate, and, as your excellency knows, there are
precedents for the informal visits on the part o£ war vessels o£
a friendly nation. * * *
Secretary o£ the Navy Long's memorandum in relation to the
visit o£ Scorpion states: 8
In the practice o£ this Department there is a distinct and
well recognized difference between the visit o£ a man-o£-war
and a visit for 'scientific purposes,' such scientific purposes being
usually hydrographic and occasionally topographic examination
o£ territorial 'vaters or shores o£ a foreign country.
The Department would ordinarily not order one o£ its vessels
to any port o£ any country having a recognized government
to conduct surveys or examinations, without having first not
only notified that government o£ its wish, but having obtained
explicit permission £or conducting the survey upon the occasion
o£ the visit.
On the other hand, it would neither send notice nor request
permission in case the visit was not undertaken for the purpose
o£ conducting such survey or other similar purpose, unless the
waters proposed to be visited were expressly denied to passage
o£ men-o£-,var by national decree, as in the case o£ the Amazon.
In 1895, American missionaries apprehended massacres in Mar ash,
Hadjin, Or£a and other cities under Turkish control. U.S.S. 11/arblehead was ordered to the Gulf o£ Alexandretta to find the £acts.
Secretary o£ State Olney replied in response to an inquiry by the
Turkish Minister that the visit was: 9
* * * in pursuance o£ a long established usage o£ the government to send its vessels, in its discretion, to the ports o£ any
country which may £or the time being suffer perturbation o£
public order and where its countrymen are known to possess
interests. This course ]s very general with all other governments,
and the circumstances that a transient occasion for such visits
may exist does not detract from , their essentially friendly
character. * * *

Naval Armed Reconnaissance in
Oi1-'il Disturbance As "Intervention"
A United States naval vessel in the port o£ Exaltacion ,vill affect
the insurgency. Contact o£ an informal nature with Salvaje may be
s Ibid., 570.
9 Ibid., VI 342.
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necessary to obtain information. The visit may be taken by others
either as an effort to overawe the insurgents or as a gesture in their
support.
These effects will be characteristic by-products o:f a naval reconnaisance during civil strife. They may :furnish :for this reason the
basis o:f a charge o:f "intervention" in the domestic or :foreign affairs
o:f the state concerned.
The problem has been discussed as one o:f "offensive" intelligence
gathering or "espionage.'~ The unmentioned but effective by-products
o:f the visit usually are the injuries provoking the charge o:f "intervention."
In the Corfu Channel Oase,10 :for example, two British destroyers
were damaged by underwater explosions. These explosions were
believed by the British to have been produced by mines moored in
Albanian territorial waters in the Cor:fu Channel.
The United Kingdom announced its intention to sweep the channel. The International Mine Clearance Board decided to order a
sweep i:f Albania consented.
Albania withheld its consent. But the United Kingdom nevertheless swept the channel, protecting its minesweepers by a large
covering :force.
Thereafter, be :fore the World Court, the United Kingdom argued
in part that the sweep was justifiable because it was executed to
obtain evidence to :facilitate the task o:f the Court. The Court
rejected this argument, stating: 11

***

The Court can only regard the alleged right o:f intervention as the manifestation o:f a policy o:f :force, such as has,
in the past, given rise to the most serious abuses and such as
cannot, whatever be the present defects in international organization, find a place in international law. Intervention is perhaps
still less admissible in the particular :form it would take here;
:for :from the nature o:f things, it would be reserved :for the most
powerful States, and might easily lead to perverting the administration o:f international justice itself. * * *
The evidence obtained in the sweep was a vital part o:f the British

International Court of .Justice, The Corfu Channel Case (Merits), .Judgment
of April 9th, 1949, I. C. .J. Rep. 4 (1949).
ll[bid., 35.
10
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case. The Court did not hesitate to consider the evidence in its
decision in favor of the United Kingdom. 12
The language of the Court concerning the propriety of an intervention by a naval force in the territorial waters of another state
in order to obtain the evidence necessary to support a claim against
the latter is in response to the case presented by Albania. Yet the
injuries to Albania were not considered explicitly. Apart from
injury to Albanian pride and dignity, there were two major injuries.
First was the adverse effect of the naval demonstrations upon the
concomitant Albanian boundary dispute with Greece. The second
was the disturbing effect upon the internal order of Albania where
the Hoxha government was not then firmly entrenched. 13
Whatever the intention of the United Kingdom may have been
concerning the Albanian-Greek dispute or the stability of the
Hoxha government, it clearly needed a passage through the channel
and evidence to support its claim for damaged vessels and loss of
life. Under the circumstances in the Corfu Channel area in 1949
these by-products probably could not have been avoided. Avoiding
similar by-products, however, is a major task in a naval reconnaissance during civil strife if an intervention argument is to be
denied an existing or prospective adversary.
During a naval reconnaissance the factual matrix is amenable to
management in a marked degree. Reliance may be placed upon past
acceptance of nonhostile naval visits to avoid intervention arguments.

Doctrine of "lnter'Vention"-Preliminary
Discussion-Background
But what foundation for an "intervention" argument might be
provided by a naval reconnaissance assuming the most adverse
circumstances? Difficulty stems from varied and conflicting definiA summary of difficulties of the old "Permanent" Court and the present
World Court in finding facts in cases before them and suggestions for reform
appear in Alford, "Fact Finding by the World Court," 4 Villanova Law Review,
37 (1958). These· difficulties have been shared by other international organizations. The United Nations Special Committee formed to investigate the alleged
intervention of the Soviet Union in Hungary was not allowed to enter Hungary
and based its report on information obtained without direct observation. U.N.
Doo. GA/3592, 11th Sess., Supp. No. 18.
13 For opposing views concerning seizure of the evidence, see Nasim Hasan
Shah, "Discovery by Intervention: The Right of a State to Seize Evidence
Located Within the Territory of the Respondent State," 55 A.J.I.L., 595 (1959) ;
Fitzmaurice, "The Law and Procedure of the International Court: General
Principles and Substantive Law," 27 Brit. Y.B. Int. L., 5 (1950).
12
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tions of "intervention" by publicists and the unwillingness of some
to experiment with definitions.
In the Discussion of Situation 3 in this Chapter, the difficulties
in a definition of "intervention" and the shortcomings of the prevailing definition based on "coercive impact" will be explored. A
test for intervention geared to administrative requirements in regulating coercion will be suggested.
It should be observed at this point, however, that by none of the
usual treatments of "intervention" would a naval reconnaissance be
impermissible. While all intercourse between states has some impact
in the territories of the states involved, stretching the concept of
intervention to cover all impact would stretch the concept to the
breaking point. Indeed, it has been observed that the rule of law
in international affairs depends upon "intervention" for its support.
"Non intervention," like "sovereignty," should not be taken as an
absol ute. 14
·
The usual definitions of "intervention" stress "method," "purpose" and "impact." Oppenheim defines intervention as "* * *
dictatorial interference of a State in the affairs of another State for
the purpose of maintaining or altering the condition of things." 15
Hyde concentrates upon the effects of the action, describing intervention as "* * * interference of a State in the affairs of another
State in opposition to its will and serving by design or implication
to impair its political independence." 16
Elements of both definitions are combined by Thomas and Thomas.
These authors describe intervention as occurring "when a state or
group of states interferes, in order to impose its will in the internal
or external affairs of another state, sovereign and independent, with
which peaceful relations exist and without its consent, for the purpose of maintaining or altering the condition of things." 17 Thomas
and Thomas emphasize: 18
* * * A fact of importance which is often forgotten is that
there must be in the influence a factor to force compliance
with the will of the interfering state. The interference must
take place as action or inaction or threats thereof of an adverse
nature or are thought to be adverse in case the state should
fail to conform to the will of the intervening state.
Fenwick, "Intervention and the Inter-American Rule of Law," 53 A.J.I.L.,
873 (1959).
15 I Oppenheim, International Law, 305 (8th Ed., 1955).
16 I Hyde, International Law, 246 (1947).
17 Thomas and Thomas, Non-Intervention, 71 ( 1956).
18 Ibid., 72.
14
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By the Oppenheim or Hyde definitions, or the more precise
definition by Thomas and Thomas, a mere reconnaissance by a naval
vessel to determine the facts in a civil disturbance is not a delict.
There is no "dictatorial" interference nor is there an intention to
alter or maintain local political conditions.
It is possible that information so acquired may prove the basis
for a decision to take military action to preserve ·united States lives
and property when local authorities are unable or unwilling to
discharge an international responsibility to do so. But the political
"independence" of the state concerned cannot be said to be materially
affected by the action if limited to these ends. There is no "coercive~'
element either in obtaining the information or in using it.
Publicists have deduced from the doctrine of "independence" of
a state in international law an implied prohibition upon the projection of the power of one st~te into the territory of another.
Since states exist in an environment in which their peoples are interdependent for values, and the decisions of officials in one state for
this reason normally have some impact in the territory of another,
these scholars appear to view all interstate impacts as presumptively
interventions of a "delictual" nature. Ho·wever, they seek to establish
permissive areas of intervention-such as "normal commercial diplomatic intercourse," "self-defense," "reprisal" or "exercise of a
treaty right."
This approach tends to accept state protests as an index of the
offensive nature of a specific action. But these protests have been
made when there is no offensive impact of a serious nature and
often recite objections other than the real complaint.
Within recent years protests made either for "diplomatic spying"
or for the espionage activities of amateurs, co1nbining gathering o£
political and economic intelligence with study, business or travel,
have been highly publicized. These protests are intended to plug
inadvertent leaks in government communications channels, rally
support to the government by dramatizing a foreign menace, or
create bargaining advantages.
Robert .LL\... Vogeler, for example, was convicted of espionage and
sabotage in Hungary in 1950. He was released in exchange for a
United States agreement to reopen Hungarian consular offices in
New York and Cleveland, validate passports of American citizens
for Hungary and deliver Hungarian goods held in the United States
Zone of Germany. 19
Protests concerning espionage should not be taken as expressing
24 Department of State Bulletin, 723 (1951) ; New York Times, 29 April
1951.
19
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a consensus that espionage or other covert or overt intelligence
efforts are "interventions" in violation of international law. While
espionage is a crime by the la.ws of all states, it has never been
considered clearly an immoral act unless involving an element of
treason. Espionage, of course, may be associated with acts, such as
sabotage, that are considered interventions. Espionage may be so
intertwined with the illegal act that it cannot be separated from it.
A special method of espionage or reconnaissance may be condemned as an "intervention." There is general agreement, for instance, that invading the territorial airspace of a state, covertly or
overtly, without its consent is an international delict. 20 Any incursion
into the territorial airspace is delictual whether the mission of the
aircraft is carry and drop a bomb, introduce saboteurs, or photograph the terrain.
Differences in treatment may be accorded the aircraft, it~ pilot
and passengers depending upon its mission and the circumstances
under which it intrudes. 21 Yet the mere aerial intrusion is regarded
as a delict irrespective of the mission.
Espionage by the pilot, such as that by Pilot Pow~rs in his U-2
mission, may enhance the offense. But the ·method of espionage is the
serious feature which is likely to result in its characterization as
an international legal delict.
There is a "legaF' advantage in reconnaissance by a naval surface vessel. The method of reconnaissance or espionage, depending
upon the overt or covert nature of the operation, is one that has
been accepted for many years and to which the rights and obligations
of states in an insurgency have been geared.
Air surveillance may produce information bearing upon the degree
of military investment of Exaltacion but can contribute little concerning the intentions of the insurgents or the attitude of the population. Air surveillance may be interrupted by bad weather. It is
difficult to maintain for long periods of time, and presents the
hazard of incidents through failure of the competing factions to
identify the aircraft.
Surface vessels are easily identified. Their right of approach to
determine the effectiveness of a blockade is clearly settled.
As stated by Secretary of State Van Buren in 1831: 22
It is not inconsistent with the principles of international law
for a neutral sovereign to send an armed cruiser to watch a
See Wright, "Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident," 54 A.J.l.L., 836 (1960).
See Lissitzyn, "The Treatment of Aerial Intruders in Recent Practice and
International Law," 47 A.J.I.L., 559 (1953).
22 VII Moore, Digest, 790 ( 1906).
.2o
21
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blockaded coast, so as to see no injustice is done to his own
merchant vessels, and that they may be prevented f rom any
irregular proceedings.
There may be special circumstances, such as the Albanian-Greek
dispute or the amount of force employed in the 0 orfu 0 hannel 0 ase,
placing the method of naval surface surveillance in an unfavorable
perspective. The commander must take care that his action is limited
to reconnaissance and that gestures of support for either side are
avoided.
Thus, Captain Voorhees was dispatched in the frigate Congress,
in 1844, to Montevideo to observe and protect American interests
during a civil contest in Uruguay. Montevideo was then besieged
by General Oribe and was blockaded by cooperating vessels of the
Argentine Confederation.
Sancala, an armed schooner of the Oribe faction, pursuing a
fishing boat supplying the besieged forces, accidentally fired upon an
American merchantman and then took refuge with the Argentine
fleet.
When Captain Voorhees learned of this, he captured S ancala
and followed up this success by capturing the Argentine blockaders.
His action was disavo·wed by the United States. Captain Voorhees
was court-martialed and convicted of disobedience of orders, having
been enjoined by Commodore Turner to "maintain a strict and
unqualified neutrality in all things."
His letter of reprimand by Secretary Bancroft and the findings
and sentence of the Court were transmitted to the Argentine
Minister "with an expression of the hope that his Government would
see in it a satisfactory proof of the disposition of the United States
'to respect the rights of Buenos Aires'." 23

"Intervention" Defined by Internation-al Agreements
There is nothing in the treaties or conventions to which the United
States and Nueva are parties prohibiting a naval reconnaissance of
the type contemplated. This assumes the reconnaissance wpl be
conducted with adequate care to avoid foundation for a charge of
"intervention" based upon customary international law.
Article 2, paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter, upon which
many publicists have relied to urge a "conventional" nonintervention
rule a part from customary international law, requires members
to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state "or in any way
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."
23

Ibid., I 182.
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Force is neither threatened nor necessarily used in an armed reconnaissance. The threat or use of force is likely to frustrate the purpose of the mission. There is no attack upon the territorial integrity
or the political independence of the state concerned. The reconnaissance is designed to explore the existing conditions and provide a
basis for evaluation of their possible, future trend.
One of the major purposes of the United Nations is to function
as a center for the exchange of information upon which the international legal rights and responsibilities of states are based. Securing this information by a naval reconnaissance without hostile
intent supports rather than impedes this function.
Most relevant "nonintervention" doctrine in treaty form with
which the United States and Nueva might be concerned has developed ·within the Inter-American system. Western Hemispheric
nations have maintained continuing pressure upon the United
States to accept by treaty a limitation of "nonintervention" in its
relations with them.
At the Third International Conference of American States in
1906, a convention 'vas signed creating an International Commission of Jurists 'vhich w·as to prepare a codification of international
law applicable to the American Republics. The Third Committee of
this Commission considered in 1913 a rudimentary nonintervention
doctrine. This 'vas, simply, that the only kinds of conduct in the
affairs o£ a state, exercisable by another without intervention or
"imposition," vvere "good offices" and "1nediation."
The Commission, ho,vever, in 1928 recom1nended for consideration by the Sixth Conference of American States the more general
formula: "No state has a right to interfere in the internal affairs
of another." 1Vhile this statement 'vas sufficiently flexible to be
construed by a foreign secretary substantially as he desired, the
provision failed to be adopted by the Conference largely because of
the opposition of the United States.
The United States posi6on was altered in the Franklin Roosevelt
Administration. 1,he United States accepted at the Seventh Conference the formula rejected in 1928, ,vith the further inclusion of

"external affairs" as a prohibited area of intervention. The United
States reserved its rights "as generally recognized by international
hnv." But even this reservation vvas dropped in the Additional
Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention signed at Buenos Aires in
1936. In this Protocol, the contrac6ng parties declared inadmissible: 24

24

51 Stat. 41 (1937).
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* * *

the intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or external
affairs of any other of the parties.
A violation of the provision was to: "* * * give rise to mutual
consultation, with the object of exchanging views and seeking
methods of peaceful adjustment."
Following World War II, the United States accepted the sweeping statements of intervention, keyed to coercion, which appear in
the Charter of the Organization of American States. 25 Article 15
2 U.S. Treaties 2394. Often called the "Bogota Charter," the pact was
signed in 1948 and entered into force for the United States in 1951. The Organization of American States has roots in the Congress of Panama called by
Simon Bolivar in 1826. It began to assume its current form in the International
Union of American Republics. This was later renamed the International
Bureau of American Republics, and ·still later renamed the Pan American
Union, in a series of Inter-American Conferences between 1889 and 1910.
The Pan American Union became an information and secretarial center
and a focal point for many conferences, commissions and technical organizations functioning .in the Inter-American field. The Organization of American
States continues the Pan American Union and gives formal status to a
number of its activities.
In addition to the Pan American Union, the permanent bodies are the
Council (formerly the governing board of the International Bureau of
American Republics, the predecessor of the Pan American Union) and the
Specialized Organizations.
The Council is the permanent executive body and a provisional organ of
consultation. It has three dependent organs: (1) The Inter-American Economic and Social Council; (2) The Inter-American Council of Jurists with
a permanent Inter-American Juridical Committee; and (3) The Inter-American
Cultural Council.
The Specialized Organizations are six intergovernmental organizations
established by multilateral agreement having functions in technical areas.
These are: (1) Pan-American Sanitary Organization; (2) Pan American
Institute of Geography and History; (3) American International Institute for
the Protection of Childhood; (4) Inter-American Commission of Women; (5)
Inter-American Indian Institute; (6) Inter-American Institute of Agricultural
Sciences. The Pan American Union is the general secretariat of the Organization.
In addition to these permanent bodies there are three regul~rly organized
assemblies. These are: ( 1) The Inter-American Conference; c!n Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs ; and ( 3) Specialized Conferences.
The Inter-American Conference is the supreme authority off the OAS. It
determines general policy, institutional reform and other matters. The InterAmerican Conference meets every five years.
The Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers is an emergency assembly
to consider questions of urgent importance. The Meeting may be called at the
request of any member state, unless an armed attack occurs upon one of the
American States. In this case a meeting must be called immediately by the
25

152

of the Charter reaffirms the provisions of the 1936 Protocol. But
added to these provisions are restrictions upon interventions by
groups of states, prohibiting the use of armed forces, and a prov1s1on covering:
* * * any other form of interference or attempted threat
against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements.
Article 16 forbids a state to :
* * * use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an
economic or political character in order to force the sovereign
will of another state and obtain from it advantages of any kind.
Article 17 provides :
The territory of a state is inviolable; it may not be the object,
even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures
of force taken by another state, directly or indirectly, on any
grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion
shall be recognized.
Articles 18 and 19 key the application of Articles 15 through 17
to existing treaties, including the Rio Treaty. Article 18 binds the
American states in their international relations "* * * not to have
recourse to the use of force, except in the case of self -defense in
accordance with existing treaties or in fulfillment thereof." Article
19 makes clear that measures adopted to maintain peace and
security in accordance with existing treaties do not violate the
principles set forth in "Articles 15 and 17."
It would appear, however, that the reservation in Article 19
must be construed to extend to Article 16 as well as to Articles 15
and 17, expressly stated, since Article 16 is a specific statement of
the general principle expressed in Article 15. Article 16 is limited
0

0

Chairman of the Council of the OAS. The Meeting of Consultation is frequently
referred to as "the Organ."
An Inter-American Peace Committee performs a "watch-dog function" and
suggests measures and steps toward settlement of a dispute.
The Inter-American Defense Board is the military planning agency for the
collective defense of the Western Hemisphere. An Advisory Defense Committee, made up of military authorities from the various states, advises the
Meeting of Consultation or the Council in case of sudden aggression.
It should be observed that, unlike the United Nations Organization and the
Regional Defense Organizations, the Inter-American system is made up of a
large number of Inter-American agreements with the OAS Charter as the
keystone. The security system, for example, is based upon the Rio Treaty, 62
Stat. 1681 (1948). Most American States are members of the Organization
except Canada, the newly independent Caribbean States, Guyana, and the
British, French and Dutch dependencies.
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to coercive measures, while Article 15 seems broad enough to embrace coercive measures as 'vell as noncoercive measures. An exception applicable to the broader prohibition should embrace the included narrower prohibition.
Despite these comprehensive efforts to deal with intervention
by treaty, there has been no meeting of the minds among representatives of the Hemispheric states concerning the acts or the attending
circumstances which give rise to an intervention. The Latin American
tendency has been to think of intervention or "nonintervention"
as an absolute. The United States position has been to regard intervention as an act of coercive effect and to avoid any effort to develop
an exact definition of the concept. This might set bounds to its
future action to repel intervention in Hemispheric affairs by nonHemispheric states.
At the Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Santiago in 1959, the
Council of the Organization of American States was called upon to
prepare a document listing the greatest possible number of cases
constituting violations of the principle of nonintervention. 26 This
was referred by the Council to the Inter-American Juridical Committee. This Committee, 'vhile not returning an exclusive list of
interventions, set forth a number of cases upon which there was
agreement among the Latin American members. 27 The American
member dissented and rendered a separate opinion.28
The majority of the Committee restated in substance Articles
15 and 16 of the Charter and set forth situations considered illegal
"interventions." These included supply of arms; training military
expeditions; financial support of military enterprises; political acts
affecting the form or type of government; interferences in the
administration of justice; use of duress to obtain advantages; and
abusive use of recognition. Interventions in the internal politics
and administration of a state appeared especially obnoxious. Fomenting of revolutions 'vas particularly condemned.
The report of the Inter-American Juridical Committee and other
Pan American Union, Inter-American Juridical Committee, Instrument
Relating to Violations of the Principle of Non-Intervention, 1 (1959).
27 Seven Latin American states were represented on the Committee.
2B Op. cit., 19. Dr. Murdock, the American member, stated in his dissent:
"The reasons for opposing an attempt to define intervention are that, like
aggression, it is not the type of concept that is susceptible of definition. To
attempt definition by a casuistic list of so-called cases is impracticable, illusory
and misleading. Definition is not in the interest of peace, but rather in the
interest of promoting intervention. It will impede the realistic development of
international law and the statesmanlike constitutional interpretation of the
Charter of the Organization of American States by its appropriate organs.* * *"
26
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efforts to dispel the confusion surrounding the intervention concept
in the Americas,"2 9 are likely to have little immediate impact in
interstate practice so long as "intervention" has primarily political
and only secondarily legal significance. There nevertheless seems
little doubt that a simple naval reconnaissance, in view of the trend
towards emphasizing the coercive element in intervention, will be
accepted as legal under Inter-American treaties and conventions.
Article 17 of the Charter of the Organization of American States,
prohibiting violation of the territory of a state by temporary
military occupation or by "other measures of force" is the provision
upon which a possible argument of intervention would most likely
be based. This provision should be read as a whole with its last
sentence-"/n/o territorial acquisitions or special advantage obtained
either through force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized."
When so read the occupation or exertion of force prohibited
appears to be one intended to produce a value dislocation in the
state concerned and not a temporary occupation disguised as a
naval visit to an area suffering from a civil disturbance in order to
obtain information. This is so even though the visit produces a
degree of value dislocation as an unintended by-product.

Suggested Solution: Situation 1
No prior request should be made to the Government of President
Cortez. One destroyer, the minimum force, should be ordered to
Ewaltacion to ascertain the facts. The cruiser and remaining destroyer
should remain beyond N uevan territorial waters within supporting
distance.
The commander of the destroyer should be instructed to interfere
with no vessels or activities ashore unless his ship or personnel are
attacked. He should then use only the force immediately necessary
to protect his ship or personnel.
If discussions are held with PDS representatives, it should be
made clear that the United States offers the revolutionists no assistance or other encouragement. Information only is sought.
A similar position should be taken with respect to Cortez officials
encountered. If the Cortez government is in control of the port and
requests the withdrawal of the United States vessel, the vessel
29 Several comprehensive treatments of intervention by the case method
have been published. These are Hodges, The Doctrine of Intervention (1915) ;
Thomas and Thomas, Non-Intervention ( 1956) and Graber, Crisis Diplomacy
(1959). Thoughtful treatments of intervention with an emphasis upon varying
perspectives may be found in essays by Fisher, Falk, Cardozo and Burke in
Stanger (Ed), Essays on Intervention (1964).
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should withdraw promptly when the desired information is obtained.
If the Cortez government is not in control of the port and requests
withdrawal of the vessel, or if the insurgents are in control of the
port and request withdrawal, the commander must radio for instructioils and put to sea if force is used against him before these
are received.
B. PORT CLOSURE DURING INSURGENCY
Situation 2

U.S.S. Staton is ordered into Exaltacion and determines the officers
and crews of Almirante Medina and Almirante Sidonia have defected. Salvaje controls EwaZtacion. All Cortez forces have withdrawn. Outposts of Cortez troops are maintained on the roads to
Exaltacion approximately three miles from the town limits. No
United States citizens have been injured. Businesses are being reopened.
Salvaje states he will burn the lumberyards if Cortez troops
advance against the town. He has furnished his guards with thermite
grenades for this purpose.
The Captain of Staton, who has been ashore, estimates that the
insurgents have approximately 800 troops in Exaltacion. The population of the town appears neither to support nor oppose the
insurgents.
Salvaje has declared a blockade of the ports of Rivad(JJVia, Resistencia, and Santa Lucia (see map) in retaliation for the Cortez
declaration of blockade of Exaltacion. He has so informed the
Captain of Staton.
At 1100 hours Almira;nt.e Medina and Almirante Sidonia are
attacked by Cortez aircraft. A lmirantre Sidonia is hit. Both vessels
depart the port and proceed through N uevan territorial waters
towards Rimadavia.
At 1500 hours U.S.S. Montgomery receives a message from S.S.
American Pioneer, a vessel of United States registry, that she is
intercepted by· Almirante Medina while proceeding to Rivadavia,
but while on the high seas, approximately seventeen marine miles
from the coast. The master has been informed by the boarding officer
that a blockade has been declared by Salvaje and his vessel will
be seized if she enters N uevan territorial waters bound for Rivadavia.
At 1600 hours the Cortez minesweeper, Fifth of September, intercepts, visits, searches and seizes S.S. I o1oa 0 oms talk within one
marine mile from Exaltacion under the fire of PDS shore batteries,
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places a prize crew aboard and proceeds through N uevan territorial
waters towards Resistencia.
No signal is received from Iowa Cornstalk. She is believed of
United States registry. What action should be taken by United
States naval forces in the area ~
Discussion: Situation 2

Blockade and Belligerent Recognition
Although Cortez has declared a "blockade" of Exaltacion, it is
doubtful the term is used in the sense of a "blockade jure belli."
Establishment of a blockade jure belli would be recognition by the
de jure government of the insurgents as belligerents. This recognition would come, awkwardly, when the insurgency is in its initial
stage. In this initial stage Salvaje might be quickly abandoned by
his supporters and crushed by the government ·forces. Recognition
of the insurgent belligerency by Cortez would strengthen Salvaje's
hand.
Premature recognition by the United States of insurgents' belligerency would probably be treated by Cortez as an ''intervention."
The United States, for example, protested as premature British belligerent recognition of the Confederacy. The protest was made,
although the Union Declaration of Blockade of April 1861 had
described a blockade jure belli and the Confederates possessed military power and exercised de facto control over a territory greater
than that of the N uevan insurgents.
The existence of insurgency in a state creates no special rights
or obligations for other states in international law. But when the
revolt affects the interests of foreign states in a manner requiring
definition of their relations to the insurgents, then these foreign
states are entitled to recognize the rebels as belligerents, whether
the de jure government grants such recognition or not. ~he question
is one of fact.
As stated by The United States Supreme Court in The Prize
Oases: 30
* * * Insurrection against a government may or may not
culminate in an organized rebellion, but a civil war always
begins by insurrection against the lawful authority of the
government. A civil war is never solemnly declared; it becomes such by its accidents-the number, power and organization of the persons who originate and carry it on. When the
party in rebellion occupy and hold in a hostile manner a certain
ao The Brig Amy Warwick et. al. (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black),
635, 666 ( 1862) .
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portion of territory; have declared their independence; have
cast off their allegiance ; have organized armies; have commenced hostilities against their former sovereign, the world
acknowledges them as belligerents, and the contest a war. * * *
If belligerency of the N uevan insurgents was recognized by
Cortez' declaration of "blockade," the insurgents acquire belligerent
rights in international law and are entitled to establish their own
blockade jure belli.
If the United States recognized the rebel belligerency, it could
then claim neutral status for its vessels. Its obligations would shift
under such treaties as the 0o1Vvention on the Rights and Duties of
States in the Event of Civil Strife. 31

Facts Bearing Upon Belligerent Recognition
Reconnaissance by Stat on has revealed the insurgents far from
a condition possibly eliciting recognition of their belligerency
either by the Cortez government or by another state. The insurgents control one town. They have an army of 800 men. Two
insurgent destroyers are at sea. One is probably damaged. Support
of the insurgents by the population of Ewaltacion is in doubt.
While the insurgents have driven Cortez troops out of Ewaltacion,
the town is partially invested. The insurgents have not commenced a
struggle to oust the de jure government. At this stage they simply
claim reinstatement of their party and appointment of their leader
to high political office.
The insurgency shows signs of developing into a full-scale revolt.
But this does not justify belligerent recognition by the United
States of the rebels or reading into the declaration of "blockade"
by Cortez a meaning which the facts revealed by the reconnaissance
fail to support.

Suggested U.S. Naval Policy Absent Belligerent Recognition
The United States naval forces should deny to both the de jure
government and the insurgents belligerent rights to establish a
blockade jure belli with respect to United States vessels. United
States naval forces should oppose a visit and search or attempted
seizure by Nuevan vessels of United States vessels on the high seas.
A simple visit by a government or insurgent vessel to give notice
of the existence of a declared "blockade" without further action to
obstruct or hinder an American vessel should be unobjectionable.

3146

Stat. 2749 (1929-31). Relevant provisions of the convention are considered hereafter in this Discussion.
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Effect of Port Closure by De Jure Government

However, either the de jure government or the rebels, although
they cannot maintain a blockade jure belli without belligerent recognition, may be able to close N uevan ports.
United States policy concerning closure of ports by a de jure
government is unclear because of inconsistency between American
statutes and our diplomatic practice dealing with port closures.
The United States seems to apply a double legal standard, one
\vith respect to its own insurgents-another with respect to insurgents in other states.
The United States statutes dealing with port closures, enacted
during the American Civil vVar, perrnit closure of an insurgent
port in the lJnited States si1nply by deeree. Domestic or foreign
vessels violating such a dBcree are forfeit. 32
By 011r diplomatic standard, a de j~tre government can close ports
in insurgent hands only by a blockade effectively maintained. Application of this standard is puzzling because of United States policy
to withhold belligerent recognition. Nevertheless, the acts deemed
necessary to close a port see1n to constitute a blockade jure belli
·with the consequences flo,ving therefrom.
In the Spanish Civil \Var, for exarnple, the United States withhe] d belliger(?nt recognition of the Franco insurgents. When the
loyalist government declared certain ports and adjacent areas a war
zone to 'vhich entry would be prevented by the loyalist fleet, the
United States replied it could not:
* * * admit the legality of any action on the part of the
Spanish Government in declaring such ports closed unless that
Government declares and maintains an effective blockade o:f such
ports. * * * 33
~1\. similar position was taken by the United States concerning
closures of Chinese ports in Communist hands by the Nationalist
Chinese Government in 1949.34
In the Spanish aud Chinese civil \Yars, the strength and activity
of the insurgents produced a de facto belligerency whether other
states recognized these facts or not. It may be that the posture o:f
the TJnited States in these conflicts ·was to force recognition o£ this
de .facto condition by the de jure governments. The lT nited States
would then be in a sound position to insist upon neutral rights for
50 U.S. Code 205 et. seq.
15 Departm,ent of State Press Releases, 192 ( 1936).
34 21 Department of State Bulletin, 34 ( 1949).
32
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its shipping without preceding the de jure government in recognizing the insurgent belligerency. However, the United States has
assumed the same posture when no de facto belligerency existed.
Thus, in 1912, Veracruz fell into insurgent hands under conditions not warranting their recognition as belligerents. The port
was closed by a decree of the l\fexican Federal Government.
The United States Charge d'Affaires informed the Mexican
Foreign Office : 35
As a general principle a decree by a sovereign power closing
to neutral commerce ports held by its enemies, whether foreign
or domestic, can have no international validity and no extraterritorial effect in the direction of imposing any obligation
upon the governments of neutral powers to recognize it or to
contribute towards its enforcement by any domestic action on
their part. If the sovereign decreeing such a closure have a naval
force sufficient to maintain an effective blockade and if he duly
proclaim and maintain such a blockade, then he may seize, subject to the· adjudication of a prize court, vessels which may
attempt to run the blockade. But his decree or acts closing ports
which are held adversely to him are by themselves entitled to
no international respect. The Government of the United States
must therefore regard as utterly nugatory such decrees or acts
closing ports which the United States of Mexico do not possess,
unless such proclamations are enforced by an effective blockade.
Under circumstances such as those at Veracruz, the Mexican
Federal Government could not be expected to recognize the rebels
as belligerents nor would the United States formally have accorded
such recognition. 36 Yet, it is clearly settled in international law that
a blockade of the type described and with the consequences expressed
in the United States note is a blockade jure belli requiring a state of
belligerency.
The diplomatic position of the United States with respect to
closure of ports in insurgent hands by de jure governments stems
from the diplomatic position of the Union with repect to the Confederate blockade. Confederate belligerency was never expressly
recognized by the Union. Yet an effective "close" blockade of Southern ports was maintained by the Union Navy. Precedent in diplomatic correspondence has perpetuated this anomalous position of
the United States with respect to insurgencies in other countries.

35
36

VII Hackworth, Digest, 166 ( 1943).
See I Hyde, International Law, 198-202 (1947).
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Positions 0 oncernlng Port Closures Taken by
States Other than United States
Four positions have been taken by states other than the United
States concerning port closures in the hands of insurgents by de
jure governments. By the view popular in Latin America, a decree
of closure is sufficient. A second view requires recognition of belligerency followed by imposition of a blockade jure belli. A third view,
that expressed also in United States diplomatic correspondence,
requires maintenance of a blockade which is de facto effective
whether belligerency is recognized or not. A fourth view recognizes
acts done by the de jure government, and perhaps the insurgents
as well, within the territorial waters of the state in which the insurgency occurs. This recognition is not extended to acts done on
the high seas, unless a state of belligerency is recognized. The fourth
view appears the most reasonable of those mentioned; and substantially accords with generally accepted international legal doctrine concerning the powers of a state within its territory.
In 1924, the port of Frontera, Mexico, in the hands of insurgents,
was closed by the de jure Mexican Government. The United States
had been informed officially of the closure. It had replied that a
port in the hands of insurgents could be closed only by an effective
blockade.
On 20 April 1924, Gaston, an American ship, entered Frontera
and began unloading her cargo on the following day. In the afternoon, she was ordered to leave the port by a Federal gunboat, Agua
Prieta. When this order was repeated on the 22nd, Gaston departed,
having unloaded only part of her cargo. She left on the dock a
quantity of bananas which quickly spoiled.
A claim for the loss of the bananas was brought by the United
States on behalf of the American owners before the United StatesMexico General Claims Commission.
With the United States member dissenting, the Commission
stated in part: 37
* * * [I]t has been submitted by the respondent government
/Mexico/ that the law protecting neutral commerce is not the
same after the World War of 1914--1919 as it was before. The
old rules of blockade were not followed during the war, and
they cannot, it is submitted, be considered as still obtaining.
Indeed, this seems to be the view of most post-war authors.
They point to the fact that the use of submarines makes it
37

United States (Oriental Navigation Co. Claim) v. United Mexican States,

U.S.-Mexico, General Claims Commission (1928), Opinions of Commissioners
(1929).
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almost impossible to have blockading forces stationed or cruising
'vithin a restricted area that is well known to the enemy.
On the other hand, they argue, it cannot be assumed that
there will be no economic warfare in future wars. Is it not a
fact that Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations
even makes it a duty for the Members of the League, under
certain circumstances, to carry on economic warfare against an
enemy of the League? But the economic warfare of the future,
it must be assumed, will apply means that are entirely different
from the classical blockade, and the old rule of the Paris Declaration of 1856 38 will have to yield to the needs of a belligerent
state subjected to modern conditions of naval war.
I£ the view set forth were accepted, there would seem to be
little doubt that the rather moderate action of the Agua Prieta,
consisting in simply forcing off the port a neutral vessel without
doing any harm to the vessel or her crew, must be considered
to be lawful. The Commissioner, however, deems it unnecessary
to pass an opinion as to the correctness of that view, which,
at any rate, for obvious reasons could not be adopted without
hesitation. The Commission is of the opinion that the action
of the Agua Prieta can hardly be considered as a violation
obtaining before the world war. It is true that, according to
that law, the trading of the Ga8ton to the Port of Frontera was
perfectly lawful.
The Federal Mexican authorities would not be justified in
capturing or confiscating the vessel, or in inflicting any other
penalty upon it. Neither would a Mexican warship have a right
to interfere, if, for example on the high seas, it met with a
neutral vessel bound for a port in the hands of the insurgents.
But on the other hand, the authorities do not show, and the
Commission is of the opinion that it cannot be assumed that
the Federal Mexican authorities should be obliged to permit the
unloading and the subsequent loading of a neutral vessel trading to an insurgent port without such clearance documents as are
prescribed by l\iexican law, even in case control of the port
should hav~ been obtained again by those authorities before
the arrival of the vessel to the port or be reobtained during
her stay there.
Now, in the present case, it cannot fairly be said that the port
as By the Declaration of Paris of 1856 is was stated: "* * * blockades in
order to be binding must be effective; that is to say, maintained by a force
sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy." The question of
effectiveness posed by a modern blockade jure belli is discussed in Chapter V.
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of Frontera 'vas in the hands of the insurgents at the time when
the events in question took place. It was in fact partly commanded by the Agua Prieta. That being the case, and none of
the authorities invoked bearing upon a situation of this nature,
the Commission holds that the la,vfulness of the action taken by
the Agua Prieta in forcing off the Gaston, which has not applied
to the Mexican Consul at N e'v Orleans for clearance, can hardly
be challenged. * * *
The situation until insurgent belligerency is recognized, in which
case a right of blockade jure belli also is created in the rebels, is one
in which the de jure government has embargoed a port over which
it lacks full control. It can exercise this control within its territorial
waters if it possesses a sufficient naval force.
Thus it may properly repel a merchant vessel attempting to enter
a closed port. It may, as in the case of Agua Pr£eta, require a vessel
to depart the closed port 'vithin a reasonable time. The vessel may
be seized to remove cargo transported for rebel military use. But the
po,ver of the de jure government must be exercised reasonably. Its
power does not extend to condemnation of the vessel after seizure
or destruction of the vessel.39
A contiguous zone in excess of the three marine mile limit may
be recognized by some states for enforcement of a port closure order.
Ho,vever, by the position generally accepted, an interception and
search to enforce a closure order can be made only 'vithin the
territorial limit of three 1narine miles. Visits, searches and possible
seizures on the high seas by the de jure government require recognition by it of the bell1gerency of the insurgents, a declaration of
blockade, and the ability to maintain an effective blockade.

Effect of Port Closure by lnsU'rgents
Limitations applicable to naval action enforcing port closures by
de jure governments upon the high seas apply to insurgent governments. 'Vhether similar doctrines apply to activity 'vi thin territorial
waters of a divided state is unclear.
It has been argued that if insurgents fully control a port, they
also control territorial ·waters adjacent to it. The de jure government is denied as a matter of law rights of territorial sovereignty
in this area. 40
See U.S. Naval War College, International Law Situations, 1938, 92-95.
See VII l\foore, Digest, 809 ( 1906) : "It thence follows that whenever the
dominion over the land is lost, by its passing under the control of another
power, whether in foreign war or civil war, the sovereignty over the waters
capable of being controlled from the land likewise ceases."
39

40
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In 1902, Professor George Grafton Wilson recommended recognizing a de facto blockade of a port 'vhen insurgents had present before
it the force required to mount an effective blockade had belligerency
been recognized. The insurgents were to use only the force necessary
to prevent entry of a merchant vessel. This force was to be used
only after the vessel ·was notified by the insurgents the United
States admitted closure of the port. 41
Professor Wilson's memorandu1n was for,varded to the Department of State for comment. Secretary of State Hay responded in
part: 42
* * * Blockade of enemy ports is, in its strict sense, conceived to be a definite act of an internationally responsible
sovereign in the exercise of a right of beiligerency. Its exercise
involves the successive stages of, first, proclamation by a sovereign state of the purpose to enforce a blockade from an announced date. Such proclamation is entitled to respect by other
sovereigns conditionally on ·the blockade proving effective.
Second, warning of vessels approaching the blockaded port
under circumstances preventing their having previous actual
or presumptive knowledge of the international proclamation
of blockade. Third, seizure of a vessel attempting to run the
blockade. Fourth, adjudication of the question of a good prize
by a competent court of admiralty of the blockading sovereign.
Insurgent 'blockade,' on the other hand, is exceptional, being
a function of hostility alone, and the right it involves is that
of closure of avenues by 'vhich aid may reach the enemy.
In the case of an unrecognized insurgent, the foregoing con-,
ditions do not join. An insurgent power is not a sovereign
maintaining equal relations with other sovereigns, so that an
insurgent proclamation of blockade does not rest on the same
footing as one issued by a. recognized sovereign power. The
seizure of a vessel attempting to run an insurgent blockade
is not generally followed by admiralty proceedings for condemnation as good prize, and no such proceedings were nominally resorted to, a decree of the condemning court would lack
the title to that international respect which is due from sovereign
states to the judicial act of a sovereign. * * *
To found. a general right of insurgent blockade upon the
recognition of belligerency of an insurgent by one or a few
foreign powers would introduce an element of uncertainty. The
scale on which hostilities are conducted by the insurgents must
41
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U.S. Naval War College, International Law Situations, 1902, 76-77.
Ibid., 80-82.
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be considered. In point o£ £act, the insurgents may be in a
physical position to n1ake war against the titular authority as
effectively as one sovereign could against another. Belligerency
is a more or less notorious fact o£ which another government,
whose commercial interests are a.ffected by its existence, may
take cognizance by proclaiming neutrality toward the contending parties, but such action does not o£ itself alter the relations
o£ other governments which have not taken cognizance o£ the
existence o£ hostilities.
Recognition o£ insurgent belligerency could merely imply the
acquiescence by the recognizing government in the insurgent
seizure o£ shipping flying the flag o£ the recognizing state. It
could certainly not crea.te a right on the part o£ the insurgents
to seize the shipping o£ a state which has not recognized their
belligerency.
* * * I A./n insurgent's right to cripple his enemy by any
usual hostile means is essentially domestic within the territory
o£ the titular sovereign whose authority is contested. To deny
to an insurgent the right to prevent the enemy from receiving
m~terial aid cannot well be justified without denying the right
o£ revolution. I£ foreign vessels carrying aid to the enemies
o£ the insurgents are interfered with within the territorial limits,
that is apparently a purely military act incident to the conduct
o£ hostilities, and, like any other insurgent interference with
foreign property within the theater o£ insurrection, is effected
at the insurgent's risk.
To apply these observations to the £our points presented in
Professor Wilson's memorandum, I may remark:
1. Insurgents not yet recognized as possessing the attributes
o£ full belligerency can not establish a blockade according to
the definition o£ international law.
2. Insurgents actually having before the port o£ the state
against which they are in insurrection a force sufficient, i£
belligerency had been recognized, to maintain an international
law blockade, may not be materially able to enforce the conditions o£ a true blockade upon foreign vessels upon the high
seas even though they may be approaching the port. Within
the territorial limits o£ the country, their right to prevent the
access o£ supplies to their enemy is practically the same on water
~son land-a defensive act in the line of hostility to the enemy.
3. There is no call £or the Government o£ the United States
to admit in advance the ability o£ the insurgents to close, within
the territorial limits, avenues o£ access to their enemy. That
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is a question of fact to be dealt "\vith as it arises. B ut in no case
would the insurgents be justified in treating as an enemy a
neutral vessel navigating the internal "\vaters-their only r ight
being, as hostiles, to prevent the access of supplies to their
domestic enemy. The exercise of this po,ver is restricted to the
precise end to be accomplished. No right of confiscation or
destruction of foreign property in such circumstances could
well be recognized, and any act of injury so committed against
foreigners would necessarily be at the risk of the Insurgents. * * *
In the Chilean Revolution of 1891, members of the Chilean
Congress boarded vessels of the Chilean fleet at Valparaiso and
proclaimed a revolt. Rear Admiral McCann, on U.S.S. Pensacola,
reported the insurgents had seized Chilean coast steamers for use
as transports. No blockade had been declared and foreign vessels
were allo,ved to pass in and out of the harbor.
His successor, Rear Admiral Bro,vn, was instructed by the Secretary of the Navy : 43
(1) To abstain from any proceedings which shall be in the
nature of assistance to either party in the present disturbance,
or from which sympathy "\vith either party could be inferred.
(2) In reference to the ships which have been declared outlawed by the Chilean Government, if such ships attempt to
commit injuries or depredations upon the persons or property of
Americans, you are authorized and directed to interfere in
whatever way may be deemed necessary to prevent such acts;
but you are not to interfere except for the protection of the
lives and property of American citizens.
( 3) Vessels or other property belonging to our citizens which
may have been seized by the insurgents upon the high seas * * *
[italics added] * * * and for which no just settlement or compensation has been made are liable to forcible recovery; but the
facts should be ascertained before proceeding to extreme. measures. * * *
When the Brazilian fleet revolted in 1893, Mr. Thompson, the
Minister to Brazil, inquired from the Department of State whether
he was "authorized to protect American merchandise placed on
Brazilian barges against the insurgents, using force if necessary,"
it being impossible to land the cargoes in Rio at that time unless
barges were used.
Mr. Gresham, the Secretary of State, replied:
There having been no recognition by the United States of
43
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the insurgents as belligerents, and there being no pretense that
the port of Rio is blockaded, it is clear that if an American
ship anchored in the harbor employs barges and lighters in
transferring her cargo to the shore in the usual 'vay and in doing
so does not cross or otherwise interfere with Mello's line of
fire and he seizes or attempts to seize the barges or lighters, he
can and should be resisted. * * * 44
Rear Admiral Benham used U.S.S. Detroit to prevent interference with the discharge of cargoes by American merchantmen.
He also prevented insurgent seizure of neutral vessels or other
cargoes even though the cargo concerned would be contraband had
a state of belligerency been recognized.
Unlike the Chilean insurgents, the Brazilian insurgents had a
land base at Desterro, the capitol of the State of Santa Catharina.
The action giving rise to the incidents occurred entirely within
Brazilian territorial waters. In neither case did the insurgents
control the shore of the port before which the hostile naval activity
occurred.
During the Spanish Civil War the right of the Franco insurgents
to control the movements of foreign vessels entering the territorial
waters of the area of contest 'vas acknowledged in state practice.
The right to interfere in any manner with shipping upon the high
seas was denied.
Within territorial waters, a foreign vessel might be seized but
not condemned; and halted but not attacked. 45 Judge Hackworth
states: 46
By their actions outside powers admitted that * * * /Franco/
* * * could intercept and interfere 'vith the co1nmerce of third
states within the 3-mile limit. This was true both at Bilbao and
at Barcelona, and his actions there were in conformity with
those usually allowed to insurgents. * * *
However, 'vhen the Spanish insurgents seized on the high seas
the United States tanker, Nantucket Chief, carrying gasoline from
the Soviet Union to the loyalist port of Barcelona, and tried and
imprisoned her captain for "complicity in rebellion,'~ the officer and
his vessel were released upon informal representations by the
United States and upon the promise by the owners to divert the
vessel from trade with Spanish ports. 47
Ibid., 1115.
See Padelford, International Law and Diplomacy in the Spanish Oivit
Strite ( 1939).
46 VII Hackworth, Digest, 171 ( 1943).
47 Ibid., 173; U.S. Naval War College, International Law Situations, 1938,
44
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The Spanish Civil War, ho,vever, was a clear situation of de f acto
belligerency, unrecognized by major po,vers for local political r easons. The interference accepted from Franco insurgents in Spanish
territorial waters without contest by other states will not be accepted
with equal submissiveness when asserted by insurgents with less
land and sea power.
As stated by Secretary of State Hay in 1902, the degree of insurgent control actually tolerated will depend upon variant facts
in each insurgency. The scope of the revolt, the extent to which
the revolt is land based, the land military power of the insurgents,
and their ability to intercept foreign merchantmen within territorial
waters, all will have a bearing on the degree of control accepted.
It is possible, for example, that insurgent control might be accepted only for ships capable of military use or of cargoes clearly
of a military nature, such as arms, ammunition, or aviation gasoline. By contrast, control by the· de jttre government over entrances
to closed ports might be accepted as plenary within territorial
waters.
Writers seem agreed that in seizures within territorial waters the
offending ves5el and its cargo cannot be condemned unless reasonable compensation is arranged promptly. Except in revolutions of
the scope of the Spanish Civil War, which was a clear de facto
belligerency, insurgents probably are restricted to forcing off a
foreign vessel from a closed port and many not seize the vessel even
for the purpose of a temporary arrest. 48
Precedents to be used as a guide to govern the relations between
foreign states and de jure and insurgent activities in territorial
waters of a divided state are likely to be developed infrequently in
the future. This is due to the inability of either party to conduct
naval activity "inshore" when faced with land-based air power or
shore ground fire. The contestants may claim powers of visit and
search and perhaps seizure on the high seas. But these powers are
likely to be contested absent recognition of their belligerency by
the foreign state involved.

Suggested Solution: Sit1tation 12
The visit of" American Pioneer by Almirante Medina is unobjectionable when limited to a warning that the vessel will be inter48 See U.S. Naval lVar College, International Law Situations, 1938, 92-93
in which the same standards are stated for both the de j'ure government and
the insurgents. Cf. Wilson, "Insurgency and International Maritime Law,"
1 A.J.I.L., 46 (1907) where a distinction is made between the de jure government and the insurgents.
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cepted in territorial waters if she proceeds into Rivadavia. Such
a warning would be necessary for a blockade jure belli when the
proclamation by the blockading power could not reasonably be
expected to have come to the attention of the merchant vessel concerned. On the other hand, a search of the vessel or a seizure of it
on the high seas would be prevented.
Within Nuevan territorial waters, a search of American Pioneer
by Almirante Medina may be permitted. Further action by the insurgent vessel must be limited to denying entrance to the port of
Rivadavia. American Pioneer must not be sunk nor may it or its
cargo be seized.
The Master of American Pioneer should be informed he will not
receive an armed escort into Rivadavia. He should be told the United
States recognizes no blockade by the insurgent forces. A United
States naval unit will interfere if his vessel is threatened on the
high seas or in terri torial waters with destruction or seizure.
Assuming Nueva is a party to the C.onvention on The Rights and
Duties of States in the Event of Civil Strife, 49 the United States
may capture an insurgent warship, such as Almirante Medina, which
damages one of its vessels. The captured warship is returned to
the control of the de ju,re government. The captains of Almirante
Medina and Almirante Sidonia should be informed of the intentions
of the United States naval force and its intention to assert the
treaty rights of the United States. 50 A United States ship should
be dispatched to the area of Rivadavia to observe the rebel destroyers.
The nationality of S.S. Iowa Cornstalk should be determined. If
S.S. Iowa Cornstalk is an American ship, the Captain of U.S.S.
Jfontgomery should inform the Captain of Fifth of September the
United States will recognize the diversion to the harbor of Resistencia only for examination of her cargo. Condemnation of the vessel
or mistreatment of her officers and crew will not be permitted.
If the cargo of Iowa Cornstalk is material susceptible to military
use, other than arms or ammunition or other war material, the
United States will permit condemnation of the cargo only if the
4946 Stat. 2749 (1929-31). 22 Western Hemisphere states, including the
United States, are parties. The major purpose of the Convention is to prevent
the support of revolutionists from the territories of adjacent states by supply
or training of troops.
so Convention on D·uties in Event of Civil Strife, Article II, paragraph 2.
An insurgent merchant vessel interfering with foreign shipping is subject to
condemnation by the capturing state as a prize. In neither case is the insurgent
vessel treated as a pirate, although it may be declared a pirate by the law of
the state in which the revolt occurs. The Convention states such a determination binds no other parties.
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owners are promptly compensated. I£ the cargo consists of arms
and ammunition or other war material, the United States will
establish no conditions for compensation of the owners. The United
States is obliged to prevent such exports pursuant to Article I ( 3)
of the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in the Event
of Civil Strife. 51
C. LANDING OF ARMED FORCES TO PROTECT PROPERTY
DURING CIVIL DISTURBANCES
Situation 3

The Captain of Staton reports Cortez army units, estimated as one
infantry division, moving into Union and Victoria, east and west of
Emaltacion. Light armor has reconnoitered PDS roadblocks near
Emaltacion during the past six hours. Cortez aircraft, overflying Emaltacion, have not been fired upon.
Salvaje has informed the Captain of Staton that if Cortez forces
move against Emaltacion he will "scorch its earth." A businessman
from Emaltacion, visiting Staton last night, confirms Salvaje has
issued orders to his troops to burn Emaltacion and its lumberyards.
During the diversion thus created, Salvaje's army will move along
the coast road to the Luna Mountains, Almirante },[edina and Almirante Sidonia returning to cover this movement. Arms and other
supplies are being landed for Salvaje's use by Antioka on beaches
near the Luna Mountains.
An officer of Staton, posted to observe rebel activity in the lumberyards, reports PDS troops are blowing safes in the offices and removing their contents. They are also removing type·writers and other
small equipment. All trucks and other vehicles have been removed
and assembled with other requisitioned civilian transportation.
A fe\v minutes ago, our Charge d'Affaires at Dolores, radioed
Cortez has rejected Salvaje's terms. Cortez intends to crush the
revolt and will begin immediate operations against Emaltacion.
U.S.S. Eutaw A\)prings (carrier), with 600 marines with airlift
capability on board, has arrived from Coloso, Antioka, and has
joined U.S.S. ill ontgomery off E;:valtacion, Rear Admiral Jones,
aboard Eutaw · Springs, now commands United States naval forces
For greater detail concerning the problems here examined, see Dickenson,
"The Closure of Ports in Control of Insurgents," 24 A.J.I.L., 69 (1930) ;
Woolsey, "Closure of Ports by the Chinese Nationalist Government," 44 A.J.I.L. ,
350 (1950) ; Powers, "Insurgency and the Law of Nations," 16 The JAG Journal
(Office of The Judge Advocate General of the Navy), 55, 59-62 (1962);
Briggs, The Law of Nations, 1000-1004 (2d Ed., 1952) ; III Hyde, International
Law, 2183-2187 (1947).
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in the area. He is instructed to "take the measures necessary in your
discretion to protect American lives and property in Exaltaaion,
using due care, however, to preserve a strict impartiality between
the parties and to employ the minimum force necessary."
Rear Admiral Jones has the information set forth. His staff is
considering legal problems involved in landing the marine force
to seize the lumberyard and the pumping station in Exaltaaion.
Should the force be landed, and, if so, when~
Discussion: Situation 3

Armed Action to Protect Persons and Property
Armed actions by the United States to protect the lives and
property of its citizens have been frequent. Forty cases in this
category were listed by Solicitor Clark of the Department of State
in 1912. Some of these actions were pursuant to the Platt Amendment, which since has been abrogated;52 Twenty-one cases have
occurred since Clark's compilation.
By contrast, actions by the United States in other states primarily
for political objects have been infrequent. The most important of
these prior to World War II were in Cuba ( 1895-98), Panama in
1903, Haiti· in 1915 and in Nicaragua in 1926-27. Action in the
Nicaraguan civil 'va.r in 1.926 was initially nonpolitical but later
developed political overtones.
United States expeditions to Archangel and Siberia in 1.918 are
often called "interventions." However, these expeditions were diversions undertaken against Ger1nany after the military collapse of
Czarist Russia.
Nevertheless, it is amply clear that whatever the United States
legal posture may have been before World War II concerning
unilateral uses of military force for limited "peacetime" objectives,
its legal obligations have since shifted, both under international
custom and treaties. Its membership in the United Nations and its
52 Clark, Right to Protect Citizens in Foreign Countries by Landing Forces
(Department of State, Division of Information, Series M, No. 14, 5 October
1912). The Platt Amendment, 31 Stat. 897 (1902) was attached to an Army
appropriation bill and later embodied in a treaty between Cuba and the United
States. The Amendment provided in part:
* * * jTjhe government of Cuba consents that the United States may
exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence,
the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life,
property and individual liberty and for discharging the obligations with
respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States, now
to be assumed or undertaken by the government of Cuba. * * *
The abroga tion appears in IV U.S.T., 4054 (1938).
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participation in regional security organizations have influenced the
legal position of the United States profoundly. Admiral Jones
might have landed the marines 'vithout hesitation in 1870. Today
he must pay close attention to the treaty commitments of the United
States.
An initial problem faced by the Admiral and his staff will be
to sift out proposed actions which might be regarded by authoritative decision makers in the general community as "interventions"
and thus "delicts~' from actions which almost certainly will not be
so regarded. Reference to traditional international law texts will be
found of litle help.
The term "intervention" has been employed by observers to seek
factual orientation in terms of particular behavior and at the same
time to refer to legal conclusions stemming from their observation.
Not only are varied practices characterized as "intervention," but
the legal conclusions embraced by the term are obscure. There is
much discussion of "intervention"-and little is ever done about it.
As stated by Professor Burke: 58
* * * The same observer sometimes uses a single label to designate very different phenomena, and of course an occasional similarity in labels by no means implies similarity in factual or
legal reference. Among the major identifiable confusions of this
type are the employment of the same terms to refer to the £acts
o£ coercive conduct and to supposed legal consequences and the
use of identical concepts to refer, without qualification, to both
lawful and unla w£ul coercion. An accompanying confusion is
Burke, "The Legal Regulation of Minor International Coercion: A
Framework of Inquiry" in Stanger (Ed) Essays on Intervention, 88 (1964).
Professor Burke's essay contains a concise statement of the current positions
of a number of publicists concerned with minor coercion and presents a
suggested multifactual framework for analysis of these policy exchanges. Thus,
he commences with an appraisal of the process of interaction, identifying
the participants, their objectives, the conflict situations, the base values
involved, the strategies of the participants, the degrees of intensity of coercion
obtained and the long-term effects and the conditions under which the coercion
occurs. He then examines the claim process-categorizing the claims and
counterclaims asserted in the coercive exchanges considered with a clear
statement of claims relating to particular sanctioning goals (prevention,
deterrence, restoration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction). This is followed
by an examination of the process of decision concerning these claims and
counterclaims with recommendations for the clarification of community policy.
At a high level of decision making vvithin the general community or within
a state, this analysis or major features of it can be pursued effectivelyalthough the lower the echelon of decision, the shorter the time for decision
and the more uncertain the available evidence, the more compressed and less
detailed such an analysis must become.
58
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to be seen in the common failure to attempt to distinguish between varying intensities of coercion. * * *
Usually "intervention" is used to describe "impacts" of executing
state policies in the domestic or foreign affairs of another state.
The impacts may be the direct result of interference or may be a
remote result. Confusion has occurred because the execution of
most state policies will have a degree of impact in the affairs of
other states. Consequently, to discriminate between actions likely
to be described by authoritative decision-makers of a state or general community as "delictual" and actions which are not likely to
be so described, publicists have preferred a coercive impact test.
Thus Professor Burke's orientation is in terms of coercion although
he offers a comprehensive and useful analytical scheme by which
the context of a particular interference can be related to a process
of decision concerning this interference. Standard, and less comprehensive, statements of the "coercive impact" test appear in the
Discussion to Situation 1. The more obvious the coercion in a particular confrontation the simpler these schemes for decision making
are to apply.
Coercion, however, is a concept developed most intensively in
municipal legal systems-for example, in cases of fraud, undue
influence, duress and the like. In these cases it is often possible
to produce evidence concerning a mental response of a specified
individual to some antecedent act by another.
When the concept of coercion is transported to the international
arena, evidential lacunae tend to be encountered in an attempt to
relate any specified response to any antecedent act. The person or
persons whose wills are said to have been coerced typically are
indefinite. A search for coercive motive provides no ready answer to
the problem because state officials responsible for the interferences
under examination dissemble and conceal their motives behind
smokescreens of censorship and diversionary action.
No matter how comprehensive the analytical scheme, the scheme
cannot be applied effectively in a particular controversy unless the
facts can be found; nor can it be used in a "constitutive" sense( or in the sense of general policy guidance to support and reinforce a legal order) -unless the decision makers involved possess
major fact finding resources. When the decision maker has the
intelligence facilities to develop these facts, multifactor analytical
approaches such as that suggested by Professor Burke are ideal.
But for decision makers at low policy echelons-and these are
responsible for much of the minor (and in the future may be responsible for much of the major) international interferences-a
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touchstone for "impermissible" interferences is needed which is
within the span of intelligence or "factfinding" capabilities of the
official concerned. In the 'vriter's opinion, much of the indiscriminate
labeling of interstate interferences of varying intensities as 'intervention" stems from a search for coercion frustrated by a "credibility
gap," which causes information sources to be ignored or censorship
or other features rendering information sources inaccessible. A lack
of evidence has led publicists to presume that inter ferences by one
state in the domestic or foreign affairs of another are coercive with
the conclusion that if the interferences are coercive they probably are
"delictual."
In the analysis which is here suggested, the writer assumes that
in many confrontations involving high intensities of coercion the
analytical scheme offered by Professor Burke is the most effective
type proposed. The "'Titer also assumes that such a scheme can be
used with equal effect in low intep_sity coercive situations when factfinding resources are extensive. However, he suggests for "low-level"
decision makers dealing with coercive situations of a low intensity
with limited fact-finding resources a concept of "intervention" 'vhich
is administratively geared.

Intervention: Administratively Geared
The first requirement for an administratively geared intervention
formula is definition of a zone of interstate action in which interferences by one state in the affairs of another are "potentially impermissible." Interstate ac6on beyond this zone can then be ignored
so far as delictual aspects of the action are concerned. Action within
the zone can be tested using presumptions of fact and precise forms
of analysis.
This zone of "potentially impermissible" interference is most
effectively defined by a reference to the practice of the Security
Council of the United Nations. While action by the Council has
been frequently blocked by the veto, it is nevertheless the international institution before which most significant "intervention ~ '
controversies are brought. In almost a quarter century of practice,
standards applied by a majority of the Security Council and the
changes in these standards are amply clear. From an examination
of the Council record concerning Greek frontier incidents, for
example, support by Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia of Greek
guerrillas was unquestionably regarded as delictual by a majority of
the members although action was vetoed by the Soviet Union. 54
54 U.N. Doc. Sj486. See Goodrich and Hambro, Charter of the United Nations,
266-267 (2d Ed., 1949) in which the controversy is briefly discussed.
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Security Council practice will change. Its membership may expand
and its perspective may be modified. The zone of "potentially impermissible" interferences should change \vith these changes in composition, vie,vpoint and practice.
Fro In the perspective of a state decision maker, particularly one
at a low administrative level, an outline of the sensitive zone of
"potentially impermissible" interference can be defined by his careful judgn1ent concerning the likelihood that a majority of the
Security Council will regard the proposed act as: (a) a threat to
the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression under Article
39; (b) requiring provisional measures under Article 40; or (c)
requiring enforcement action under Articles 40 or 41. Although the
act does not fall within one of these categories, is it nevertheless
of a nature which should alert-the state decision maker to a response
by officials of the state affected \vhich will fall within one of the
three categories mentioned? The latter determination will cover
many of the "marginal" cases of "intervention."
By directing the attention of a state policy maker to the practice
of the Security Council, the doctrine of "intervention" is \vithdrawn
from confusing shado\vs cast by deductions from a theoretical "independence" of states and by the record of state protests concerning "intervention."
The Security Council is taken as a point of orientation in setting
a zone of "potentially impermissible" interferences, rather than the
General Assembly, the World Court, or regional security organizations for several reasons.
An "intervention" concept should be geared to the working of
institutions organized to manage international conflict. Apart from
its feature as a transient threat presented to general harmony,
international conflict is an important feature in developing international solidarity. The skill with which the conflict is managed
determines which feature dominates.
While opinions of the World Court bearing upon "intervention"
no doubt are influential in the Se.curity Council, the Court deals
sporadically with crystallized fact situations. It is incapable of
shepherding a conflict through its full course. Its decisions are
usually outdated when rendered. Stringent limitations upon its
jurisdiction, delays in getting cases before it, and lack of an effective
method to enforce its decisions limit the continuing participation
of the Court in conflict produced by interferences by one state in
the affairs of another.
The World Court also deals principally with cases "amenable to
legal solution." The issues presented usually are those thought
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amenable to resolution by a shift of wealth from one community to
another. Losses due to physical damage to property and personal
injuries or death can often be compensated by wealth shifting. But
the kind of damage often produced by interferences-breakdowns in
loyalty patterns, disturbances of balances of power, and destruction
of social institutions-cannot be equated to wealth losses and assessed
using wealth units.
The burden of dealing with "intervention" controversies thus
tends to fall upon the Security Council, the General Assembly and
regional security organizations. General Assembly practice is believed
not a satisfactory point for orientation because of the flux in
standards developed there due to the membership of new states in
the United Nations. In recent years, for example, a double standard
appears to have emerged in the General Assembly with seizures of
territory, such as the seizure of Goa by India or Indonesian action
against the Dutch in West New Guinea tacitly approved, while
similar action by former colonial powers is condemned. This pattern
may possibly be duplicated in the Security Council but the change
process is likely to be slower and the sense of responsibility of
Security Council members is likely to be greater than in the General
Assembly.
The practice of regional security organizations concerning intervention is dominated by local standards. The local "non intervention"
doctrine established by treaty and usage in the Western Hemisphere
is an example. Although this local practice must be considered in
an "intervention" transaction '"'ithin the aegis of these local arrangements, the practice is too deverse for the basis of a general "intervention" formula.
The chief purpose of the United Nations, as set forth in Article
1 (1) is to:

* * * /M/ aintain

international peace and security and to that
end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to peace, and for the suppression of acts of
aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about
by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of
justice and international law, adjustn1ent or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of
the peace; * * *
The Organ primarily responsible for attaining this goal under
the Charter is the Security Council. The enforcement power of the
Council is limited by the "peace attainment" statement of its functions; the veto and double veto by a permanent member pursuant
to Article 27 and its construction; and the domestic jurisdiction

176
clause in Article 2 (7) .5 :> The domestic jurisdiction limitation does
not apply to the peace enforcement functions of the Council specified
in Chapter VII.
The institution which deals at some stage with most of the serious
intervention controversies produced by interferences and which is
charged with primary responsibility for maintaining international
peace and security under the United Nations Charter is a logical
point of reference for an "administratively geared" concept of
"intervention." A study of the prior practice of the Security Council,
whether a particular decision proposed was vetoed or not, can
provide a common com pass for guidance and a sensitive receptor for
changing concepts of rights and wrongs in intervention.
Within this general zone of "potentially impermissible" interference, staked out by references to Security Council practice and
estimates of probable current responses of Security Council members,
there exists a spectrum of permissible action. Presumptions of
"permissibility" or "impermissibility" are guides to a decision maker.
The point will be discussed in detail in Situation 6, Chapter IV,
that reasonable judgments can be made concerning the ability of
international security organizations, taken collectively, to diffract
the physical features of a ceorcive exchange and project the conflict on a verbal level. These international security organizations
have developed, as a dominant function in peace maintenance,
"rheostatic" activity-or intensity reduction of interstate conflict.
I£ a reasonable judgment indicates the contemplated action,
falling within the zone o£ "potential impermissibility," is also
beyond the "rheostatic" influence o£ international security organizations, taken collectively, then the interference is presumptively
impermissible-or an "intervention." The key to such a judgment
is the probability of unmanageable "escalation of violence" stemming from the proposed action.
The form of the action may be peculiarly offensive and under the
existing circumstances, including the "rheostatic" abilities o£ international security organizations, pose a threat of unmanageable
escalation. It has been indicated in Situation 1 that air intrusions
into the territorial airspace of another state seem to be treated as
"interventions." Deploying military forces into the territory of
another state has been characterized :f;equently as an "intervention"
or "aggression.'~ Professor Quincy Wright, for example, describes
"aggression" as: 56
55 The "double veto" describes a -veto of consideration whether a particular
question is procedural, and thus not subject to the veto, or substantive and
thus subject to the veto.
56 Wright, "The Prevention of Aggression," 50 A.J.I.L., 514, 526 (1956).
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***

/T/he use of, or threat to use armed force across an
internationally recognized frontier, for which a government,
de facto or de jure, is responsible because of act or negligence,
unless justified by a necessity for individual or collective selfdefense, by the authority of the United Nations to restore international peace or security, or by consent of the state within
\vhose territory armed force is being used. * * *
It is not, however, the "armed" or "military" nature of the force
deployed or threatened to be deployed, which should render the
action "presumptively impermissible." The size of the force in
relation to its mission and the intensity of its employment or
threatened employment are the critical features.
Furthermore, it might be argued persuasively, based upon practice
since World War II, that deployments of arrned forces by FreeWorld states, \vith isolated exceptions, are designed to achieve
stability to permit ordered change and thus should be presumed
"permissible interferences" unless special facts indicate the contrary.
Publicists placing emphasis upon military force as a basic element
of an "impermissible interference" view military force in its usual
pre-World War II functions of "internal stability-external change."
Military force was then used principally to perpetuate a value
pattern within a state and to disturb value patterns without the
state to direct a flow of values to the sponsoring power base and to
diminish the power of adversaries. This is a difficult image to
eradicate.
Since World "\Var II, however, the principal role of military force
in the organization of Free-World states has been redirected to
"internal change-external stability." Prior to the separation of
Algeria from France, for example, the civil-action program of the
French Army, coupled with its policing functions, emphasized
change in the economic structure of Algeria and social reform. The
Armed Services in the United States, apart from their external
defense functions, have been made instruments of internal change,
notably in matters of racial discrimination and in industrial and
educational practices through defense contracts.
With few possible exceptions, on the other hand, external employments of armed force have been to procure stability with ordered
change accepted and accommodated. This has been the posture of
France in Indo-China, the United States and SEATO members in
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South Vietnam, the United States and other members of the United
Nations Command in l(orea and Great Britain in Malaysia.
A strong case for the permissibility of unilateral or multilateral
military action, a part from any idea of self-defense or collective
self-defense, can be built upon the interim stabilizing function of
armed action. Interim action 'vas not mentioned in the United
Nations Charter because special forces were to be earmarked for
that purpose and directed by a Military Staff Committee.
Basic to an understanding of the requirement of "interim stabilizing action~' is an understanding of the distinction between "settling
a dispute or controversy by force" and "military action to stabilize a
situation and prevent its complication pending settlement by pacific
means." The international institutional action required to manage
conflict j s similar to the extraordinary power recognized in all legal
systems and described in the Anglo-American legal system as "prerogative power."
In the constitutional division of powers in the United States, for
example, elements of this extraordinary power can be found in the
executives, the legislatures and the courts. However, time elapses
before this power can be mobilized. There are delays in invoking
action by international organizations. Time is also lost before the
machinery of these organizations can be set in motion. Without some
device to compensate for these delays, the decisions of international
security organizations would exhibit the anachronistic features of
decisions by the World Court or international arbitral tribunals.
If there were a well-organized police force available for employment by the United Nations to discharge its functions of peace
maintenance, one function of this force would be interim stabilizing action until decisions by appropriate Organs of the United
Nations could be rendered. Interim stabilizing action is only one
aspect of police functions-but satisfies the pressing demand for
temporary order.
Absent such a force, states-individually and collectively-have
undertaken this interirn stabilizing function. Not only is there
latitude in this respect for voluntary state action, but there is a
moral obligation to act-and a legal obligation to act may be developing in international custom built around the Charter.
Interim stab1~lizing action, although usually within the zone of
"potentially impermissible" interference, hitherto described, is the
most likely form of action involving military force applied with
high intensity to be regarded by the general community as "permissible." The ac6on should be within the limits of the ability of
international security organizations to exercise their "rheostatic"
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:functions-or to project the conflict on a verbal level. Interim
stabilizing action is keyed to the :functions o:f international security
organizations. It is not a substitute :for the effective performance o:f
these :functions nor should the action be taken in a manner 'vhich
frustrates the performance o:f these :functions.
The nature of 1~nterirn 8tabilizirng action is illustrated by a cornparison o:f Anglo-French action in Suez in 1956 and United States
action in Lebanon in 1958. Both actions involved deployments o:f
military :force in the territory o:f another state. The Anglo-French
action seemed regarded by the general community as "imperrnis~
sible." While criticized by some publicists, the United States action
in Lebanon seemed regarded by the general com1nunity as "permissible."

Anglo-French Action in Suez and United States Action
in Lebanon Com/pared as Interi1n Stabilization
The Anglo-French military action against Egypt in 1956 was
intended in part to insure :free passage of commerce through the
Suez Canal, to protect :foreign nations in the area, and to :frustrate
Egyptian nationalization o:f property of the Canal Company. As
stated by Sir Anthony Eden in the House o:f Commons: 57
* * * /G./rave issues are at stake, and unless hostilities * * *
(between Israel and Egypt) * * * can quickly be stopped, :free
passage through the canal would endanger the ships actually
in passage. The n1embers o:f crews and passengers would total
many hundreds, and the value of ships which are likely to be
in passage is about £50 million (sterling) excluding the value o:f
cargoes * * *.
There were also political objectives which became apparent as
the action progressed. One objective 'vas to :frustrate growing
Soviet control in Egypt . .._1\._nother was to interrupt extensive Egyptian aid to the Algerian rebels.
Anglo- French :forces had been gradually assembled in the Eastern
:JYiediterranean since the Egyptian Nationalization decree on 26
July 1956. Approximately 70,000 to 100,000 personnel ''ere in the
Anglo-French striking :force. Egyptian :forces sustained casualties
in excess o:f 1,000 before the cease-fire .
. A. nglo-French military action commenced before Israeli troops,
attacking in the Sinai Peninsula and moving rapidly, 'vere 'vithin
striking distance o:f the Canal. The action 'vas also taken shortly
after the United Kingdom and France had vetoed a Resolution in
57

U.N. Doc. SjPV 749, 30 Oct. 1956, p. 2.
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the Security Council ordering Israeli withdrawal to the 1949 armistice line and calling upon members to refrain from the threat or use
of force in the area inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations.
The Council commenced consideration of this Resolution at
approximately the time on 30 October 1956 that the United Kingdom
presented its ultimatum to Israel and Egypt. This ultimatum required withdrawal of both forces ten miles from the Canal, that
hostilities cease, and that Anglo-French forces be permitted temporarily to occupy Port Said, Ismailia and Suez. If these conditions
were not met within twelve hours, Anglo-French forces would
intervene in the strength necessary to secure compliance.
Sir Pierson Dixon, apparently conscious of the importance of an
"interim srustaining act?'on" argument, sought to delay action on the
Resolution before the British and French vetoes. Sir Pierson
emphasized in his argument the inadequate military force available
to the Council and the urgency of the situation. He asserted: 58
If we felt that the Security Council could in fact at this
moment separate the parties and protect the Canal, of course
we would rather proceed in this way. But in spite of the views
which have been expressed to the contrary, I think I must
make the point again: we feel grave doubt whether in fact
action could be taken in this Council with sufficient speed.
Events are moving too fast, too fast for words even from the
Council to have the right effect. * * *
Sir Pierson emphasized also: 59
* * * Our intervention is a temporary measure which we are
obligated to take in the absence of any effective collective
machinery for restoring peace and order in a matter of such
extreme urgency * * * I and/ * * * will be terminated as soon
as the threat to peace no longer exists. * * *
After the Resolution was vetoed by the intervening states, the case
was removed from the agenda of the Security Council, over the
opposition of the intervenors, pursuant to a Resolution offered by
Y ugoslovia. The case was then placed before the General Assembly,
acting under the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950. The General
Assembly called for a cease-fire and withdrawal of forces behind
the 1949 armistice line. 60
SjPV 749, 30 Oct. 1956, p. 24.
59 U.N. Doc. SjPV 751, p. 9.
60 A concise account of procedure before the Security Council and thereafter before the General Assembly may be found in Yearbook of the United
Nations, 25-34 (1956). The Yugoslav Resolution, as supported by the United
States, appears as U.N. Doc. Sj3719.
os U.N. Doc.
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By this time, Anglo-French :forces had virtually destroyed the
Egyptian air :force, which had approximately 90 MIG-15 fighters
and 28 Iluyshin bombers. Israeli troops, assisted by Anglo-French
seaborne and airborne landings 'vhich had cut off Egyptian Sinai
:forces :from the main body o:f the Egyptian army concentrated south
and southwest o:f Cairo, had virtually complete control o:f the
Sinai Peninsula. Israeli patrols reached the Canal by 4 November.
A cease-fire 'vas obtained on 7 November. Before ceasing hostilities,
Anglo-French :forces had seized firm control o:f key points in the
Canal area. Prior to the cease-fire the Secretary General had
assured the United Kingdom and France that the Canal would be
reopened and :free navigation secured through it. An international
:force sufficient to secure observation o:f the 1949 armistice would be
established by the United N ations. 61
The landing o:f United States :forces in Lebanon in 1959 presented striking contrasts to Anglo-French operations in Suez. Unlike
the Anglo-French operations, United States action in Lebanon was
primarily political and not economic in aim. 'I'he landings were at
the request o:f the de jure government o:f Lebanon. Small :forces
were landed without preparatory fire. 62 There was no significant
hostile action. Casualties and property damage were minimal.
The Lebanese action 'vas undertaken in a clear emergency. Such
an emergency had apparently been recognized by the Security
Council in its response to the Lebanese complaint o:f 22 May 1958
that the United Arab Republic was intervening in its internal
affairs by supplying and training rebels. 63
Although the intervention in Lebanon by the United Arab Republic had not only been verified by Western intelligence services
but was notorious :from press releases, the Security Council on
11 June 1958 directed the Secretary General to establish an observation group in Lebanon to verify the reports o:f outside interference.
The Resolution 'vas amenable to construction that the Secretary
General 'vas to act to prevent outside inter:ference. 64 However, the
Secretary General construed his po,ver as simply one to investigate.
61 For a history of subsequent events, including Anglo-French withdrawal,
development of a United Nations Emergency Force and clearance of the Canal,
see Yearbook of the United Nations, 39-56 (1956).
62 3,500 troops were landed initially. The force was increased to approximately
15,000.
63 U.N. Doc. Sj4007, 22 May 1958.
64 U.S. Doc. Sj4023, 11 June 1958. The Resolution authorized the Secretary
General to "ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of
arms or other rna terial across the Lebanese border." For the construction by the
Secretary General see U.N. Doc. SjPV 827, 15 July 1958, p. 13.
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The inves6gation by the Observation Group was frustrated by
the rebels. The rebels held 90% o£ the Lebanese frontier over which
supplies and troops from the United Arab Republic might have
come. The Observation Group was denied access to this area. 65
The Observation Group had no aircraft £or reconnaissance. It
conducted few night patrols because o£ fire dra,vn from both sides.
It had no electronic sensing devices to be used for night surveillance
£rom fixed observation posts. It is conventional practice, both in
regular armies and among guerrillas, to move supplies and troops
at night in the £ace o£ air superiority. This air superiority was
enjoyed by the de jure government.
Thus, before the United States landings on 15 June 1958, the work
o£ the United Nations Observation Group was completely ineffectual
and sho,ved no promise o£ improvement. 6'6 The de jure Lebanese
government was certain to £all unless the United States responded to
its request.
The Security Council was informed promptly o£ the United
States action. In the Security Council debates which followed, the
position o£ the lJnited States was one o£ cooperation with the
Council. The Council "'as encouraged to undertake the protection
o£ Lebanon against external i nter£erence. United States troops
'vere instructed to cooperate with the United Nations Observation
Group and did so ..A. s Ambassador Lodge stated before the Security
Council: 67
Our purpose in coming to the assistance o£ Lebanon is
perfectly clear ..As President Eisenhower explained this morning, our forces are not there to engage in hostilities o£ any kind,
much less to fight a war. Their presence is designed £or the sole
purpose o£ helping the Government o£ Lebanon at its request
in its effort to stabilize the situation brought on by threats from
outside, until such time as the United Nations can take the steps
necessary to protect the independence and political integrity o£
65 U.N. Doc. S/4040 and Add. 1, 1 July 1958. The First Report by the Observation Group stated:
* * * It will be seen, therefore, that the areas of primary concern to the
Observation Group are those where the problems of accessibility are greatest,
both from the standpoint of topography and of obtaining freedom and
security of movement.
oo The Observation Group reported its work initially impeded by an adverse
reaction among the rebels to the United States landings. U.N. Doc. Sj4069,
25 July 1958. However the strength of the Group and cooperation by the rebels
later improved, although there were no night observations by the Group except
in a few instances.
67 U.N. Doc. SjPV 827, 15 July 1958, p. 6.
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Lebanon. This will afford security to the several thousand
Americans who reside in that country. That is the total scope
and objective of the United States Assistance.
The United States offered a draft Resolution to the Security
Council which, in addition to supporting activity by the Observation Group and recommending extension of this activity, requested: 68
* * * /T/he Secretary General immediately to consult the
Government of Lebanon and other member states as appropriate
with a view to seeking an agreement for additional measures,
including the contribution and use of contingents, as may be
necessary to protect the territorial integrity and independence
of Lebanon and to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of
personnel or supplies of arms or other material across the
Lebanese border.
This Draft Resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The vote
was 9 in favor of the Resolution, 1 abstention, and 1 against.
A Resolution offered by the Soviet Union, condemning the United
States and ordering an immediate 'vithdra wal of its troops, was
defeated by a vote of 8 to 1. 'fhere were two abstentions-Japan
and Sweden.
A Resolution offered by Sweden, calling for 'vithdrawal of the
Observation Group while United States forces were in Lebanon,
was defeated by a vote of 9 to 2. 'l'he favorable votes were those of
Sweden and the Soviet Union.
A Resolution thereafter offered by the United States to remove
the case for consideration by the General Assembly did not come
to a vote. The Council adjourned on 22 July 1958 after receiving
a suggestion by the Secretary General that he might undertake to
bring the parties to an agreement. A "Summit Meeting" also was
then thought imminent.69
The case was brought again before an emergency session of the
General Assembly in August 1958. British troops had entered
Jordan in July 1958 in response to a request by King Hussein.
The Assembly considered a six-point program of action proposed
by the United States but threw the matter back into the lap of the
Secretary General. 70 The Secretary General was directed to consuit with the Arab states and make practical arrangements to
U.N. Doc. Sj4050.
This Summit Conference did not materialize but the United States and the
Soviet Union agreed on an emergency session of the General Assembly. See 39
Department of State Bullet,i n, 342 ( 1958).
70 39 Department of State Bulletin, 337 et seq. (1958).
68

69
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facilitate "early withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and
Jordan. " 71
The United States withdrew its troops from Lebanon in late
October and November of 1958. General Chehab, who received rebel
support, as well as support from government elements, had been
named President in free elections held in July. Political unrest
stemming from external sources had greatly diminished.
Both Anglo-French action in Suez and United States action in
Lebanon were \vithin the zone of "potentially impermissible" interference. The military force deployed was significant. The intense
Anglo-French use of military force might reasonably have been
viewed by the Security Council as a threat to the peace, a breach
of the peace or act of aggression. United States action in Lebanon
might have provoked a response by other states requiring provisional
measures under Article 40 or enforcement measures under Article
40 or 41.
Although falling within the zone of "potentially impermissible"
interference, no doubt a mild presumption of "permissibility" can be
said to exist based upon the past pattern of military action by
Free-World states. The Anglo-French action, however, was of such
intensity that it might have exceeded the "rheostatic" action of
international security organizations, taken collectively, had it not
been for Soviet involvement in Hungary at the same time.
Furthermore, rather than pitching their action as interim stabilization, supporting functions of the United Nations, the United Kingdom and France prevented Security Council action by a veto.
Reference of the case to the General Assembly was opposed by them.
Nationalization of the Canal was under study by the Security
Council before the Anglo-French intervention. It was only when
Anglo-French military objectives had been achieved and the adverse effect of world opinion appraised that the United Kingdom
and France were prepared to support a renewal of United Nations
functions in the crisis.
United States operations in Lebanon, by contrast, were closely
geared to efforts by the United Nations to achieve stability in
Lebanon and provide for ordered change in its government by
free elections. United States action was clearly within the "rheostatic" or intensity reducing range of international security organizations.
Anglo- French action in Suez and United States action in Lebanon
can he supported as "collective defensive'~ actions under Article
51 of the United Nations Charter. It will be suggested in greater
n U.N. Doc. Sj4053.
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detail in the Discussion of Situation 6, Chapter IV, that no m atter
how effect?·ve international organizations become as peace maintaining institutions, Article 51 permits the use of armed force to meet
armed attack. The test in such a case is the necessity and proportionality of the responding coercion vis-a-vis the initiating coercion. Likew·ise, Article 2( 4) establishes mamimum limits on the use
of force no matter ho'v ineffective international security organizations become as peace maintaining institutions.
Assuming the Anglo-French action did not exceed this maximum
limit, as a threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of a state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations, defense arguments might
be persuasive.
United States action in Lebanon was defended by government
spokesmen as "collective self-defense" under Article 51. It was
also attacked by a fe,v publicists as "impermissive" interference. 72
The defense arguments offered were unnecessary, however, because
the interim sustaining nature of the United States action was clear;
and a growing general appreciation of the importance of such
organizational services in the light of the present state of international security organization functions, promises future community
characterizations of 81.£staining actions as permissible. The intenm
sustaining action argument 'vas open to the United States but
foreclosed to the United Kingdom and France.
General criticism of the Anglo-French action in Suez should
not be regarded as condemnation of unilateral national action
to protect the lives and property of citizens under circumstances
in which the protection is of an interim nature pending action by an
international security organization. If the unilateral national action,
entailing minimum force, obviates further action by an international
security organization, the interest of the general community is well
served.

Policies in We8tern He1ni8phere Concerning Action
To Protect Property Du·ring Oivil D£sturbances
Western Hemispheric treaties and conventions, many of which were
mentioned in the Discussion to Situation 1, purport to establish new
Propriety of the United States action in Lebanon was questioned both under
the United Nations Charter and under the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Professor
Quincy Wright concluded the United States, to justify its intervention in
Lebanon, "would have to prove that the troubles in that country inducing
President Chamoun to request that intervention were primarily due to 'subversive intervention' from outside." Wright, "United States Intervention in
Lebanon," 53 .A.J.I.L., 112, 125 (1959).
72
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"intervention" doctrines. These doctrines have been vaguely framed.
An actual meeting of the minds upon various definitions appears
to have been blocked by a heavy alloy of emotion.
Agreement upon the meaning of "intervention" in the Western
Hemisphere seems closer under the Organization o£ American
States than ever before. The statement by Secretary Hughes and the
Sixth Conference of Inter-American States in 1928 continues, however, to highlight this gray area of affairs so far as the protection
o£ citizens and their property is concerned. As Secretary Hughes
commented: 73
* * * The difficulty, i£ there is any, in any one o£ the American
Republics, is not one of external aggression. It is an internal
difficulty, if it exists at all.
From time to time there arises a situation most deplorable and
regrettable in which sovereignty is not at work, in which £or a
time in certain areas there is no government at all, in which £or
a time and 'vithin a limited sphere there is no possibility of
performing the functions o£ sovereignty and independence.
These are the conditions which create the difficulty with which
at times we find ourselves confronted.
What are we to do 'vhen government breaks down and American citizens are in danger of their lives? Are 'veto stand by and
see them killed because a government in circumstances which
it cannot control and for 'vhich it may not be responsible can
no longer afford reasonable protection? I am not speaking o£
sporadic acts of violence, or of the rising o£ mobs, or o£ those
distressing incidents 'vhich may occur in any country however
well administered. I am speaking of the occasions where government itself is unable to function for a time because of difficulties
which confront it and which it is impossible for it to surmount.
Now it is a principle of international law that in such a case
a government is fully justified in taking action-! would call
it interposition of a temporary character-for the purpose of
protecting the lives and property of its nationals. * * * 0£
course the United States cannot forego its right to protect its
citizens. * * *
Secretary Hughes emphasized in his statement the protection o£
the persons of 1Jnited States citizens and only incidentally protection
of their property. The need for protection of property has been
alleviated to a degree by investment guarantees developed under
successive Mutual Security Acts and a supporting framework of
73 Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Sixth International Conference of American States, 14 (1928).
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executive agreements made bet,veen the United States and countries
participating in the mutual security program. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, for example, authorizes guarantees to assure
protection in whole or in part against: 74
Loss of investment * * * in the approved project due to expropriation or confiscation by action of a foreign government,
and
Loss due to war, revolution or insurrection * * *
These losses normally are excluded from casualty insurance cover:..
age issued by commercial carriers. But the insurance principle is the
same in mutual security program guarantees, the risk of loss being
distributed over the taxpaying public and being substantially eliminated by the la'v of large numbers.
Supplementing executive agreements with mutual security program countries, in 'vhose territories investments are guaranteed,
provide for subrogation by the United States to any claims which
its insured nationals may have. The claims are to be settled by
negotiation or arbitration. 75
The risk of expropriation remains considerable among ~Western
Hemispheric states. Ho,vever, the risk of loss due to civil disturbances is reduced due to rapidly increasing efficiency of the
national military and police forces. The spread of the Castro-Communist revolutionary influence may of course present acute problems
no matter ho'v efficient local military and police establishments
become.
~hese changes in the guaranteeing of foreign investments and
efficiency of local military and police protection may account for
statements in recent authoritative 'vorks suggesting armed force
cannot be used to protect the persons and property of citizens in
another state in the Inter-American system.
Thomas and Thomas, for example, declare with reference to the
Inter-American system : 76
No state has a right to intervene in another state in favor
of the lives or liberty of its nationals except through intercession
of diplomatic representation in a friendly conciliatory action
without any character of coercion, undertaken only after there
has been previous exhaustion o£ the possible local remedies
and a clear denial of justice. If this fails, the legality of further
action is problematical. * * *
P.L. 87-195 (4 Sept. 1961) Sections 221 et seq.
E.g., Executive .Agreement with Honduras, 6 U.S. Treaties 2049 Section
1 (c) ( 1955) .
76 Thomas and Thomas, Non-Intervention, 327 (1956).
'74
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These authors also state, after a discussion of the responsibility
of states for injuries to aliens and the right of a state to collect
debts by force : 77
Thus, it can be said that intervention by force by a state for
protection of the property of its citizens in another state has
been made illegal under the particular international law of the
Americas.
Dr. Graber writes: 78
How could frequent American interventions for the protection
of citizens in foreign countries be reconciled with the non-intervention doctrine? The answer is simple. There was no need to
reconcile them because the United States did not consider
measures taken for the protection of citizens as intervention.
When the interventionary character of these measures was
finally conceded in the twentieth century, armed protection of
citizens stopped and unarmed coercion on their behalf
dwindled. * * *
Statements such as these, when read in context, probably are
intended to apply to armed or coercive efforts to collect debts or
damages resulting from injuries to citizens. Although the "nonintervention" principle, applied to the Inter-American system, is
stated broadly by the authors cited and others, it is doubtful the
proposition stated by Secretary Hughes in 1928 is or can be obsolete.
The United States must protect its citizens when a local government
cannot protect them.
No Latin American government appears to have contested the
assertion by Secretary Hughes when restricted to the conditions
stated by him. The majority of the Inter-American Juridical Committee included no case such as that stated by Secretary Hughes
within the list of impermissible interferences prepared by it in 1959.
Indeed, the Committee cited with apparent approval the statement
by Accioly: 79
The protection of nationals, no matter where they may be,
is not only a right but a duty of the state. Since it is not, therefore, an abusive act, it lacks one of the basic elements constituting intervention.
Construction of Article 15 of the Charter of the Organization of
American States, which takes into consideration the immediately
related Articles 16, 17 and 18, suggests the actions prohibited are
77
78

Ibid., 343.
Graber, Crisis Diplomacy, 336 (1959).

79 Inter-American Juridicial Committee, Instrument Relating to Violations of
the Principle of Non-Intervention, 10 (1959).
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those that are "abusive" or "coercive." The military action specifically mentioned, such as the "armed force" in Article 15 ; the
"military occupation or * * * other measures of force'~ in Article 17 ;
and the "force except in the case of self -defense" in Article 18,
seems to refer to action with political orientation.
Military action taken to acquire territory, supersede a government, obtain special concessions or to secure various political advantages, seems easily distinguishable from limited action to protect
the persons and property of citizens which is terminated when the
persons or property are withdra·wn or are other,vise secured. Applications of military force for this limited purpose can also be made
without appreciable coercive effect upon the wills of a local power
elite, if coercion is put in issue, and-as pointed out previously in
this discussion-need not be of such an intensity that it constitutes
a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace under Chapter VII
of the United Nations Charter.

Suggested Solution: Situation 3
While military action of a preventive na ture, such as that contemplated at Eo:;altacion, may or may not receive such publicity that
it will be discussed by the Security Council of the United Nations
or by the Council of the Organization o£ American States, the action
should be planned and conducted so that it is actually preventive
and protective. The threat of the property of citizens must be clear
and if lives of citizens are also found to be endangered the case for
action will be much stronger.
The case is not one of self-defense as discussed by Secretary
Webster in The Oaroline. 80 While the threat of damage must be
clear, there need not be that "instant, over,vhelming" necessity
"leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation" cited
by Webster to Lord Ashburton.
Measures unnecessary to protect lives and property should not be
attempted. If action is initiated by either the United Nations or the
Organization of American States before the marines are landed,
United States action should be coordinated 'vith the supplementary
measures taken by these institutions. If no action is taken by these
organizations, .which is the more likely situation in view of the
short time involved, the United States position should be one of
forestalling a controversy concerning loss of lives or property by
the use of minimum force. If a threat of force will accomplish this
aim, the action should be limited to the threat. Only the commanding
officer on the spot can formulate an accurate judgment concerning
so

II Moore, Digest, 412 (1906).
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this. An argument for interim sustaining action should be built to
support the interference as "permissible."
The facts available to Rear Admiral Jones suggest Salvaje
desires to avoid contact at this time 'vith Cortez forces and is preparing to withdraw from Emaltacion. The lumberyards and much
of the town can be quickly destroyed by Salvaje's army.
At this critical stage of the revolt, Salvaje is probably desperate.
His ability to continue the fight, in view of his failure to inspire
support in Emaltacion, depends upon his ability to reach the Luna
Mountains. His eventual success, once he gets there, 'viii be based
upon his ability to enlist foreign support and to discourage foreign
support of the Cortez government.
As stated by George Modelski : 81
That every internal war- creates a demand for foreign intervention is implicit from the logic of the situation. The demand
may not always be capable of being satisfied, but it is always
there, and has been found to exist not only in modern political
history but in all known international systems. * * *
Salvaje will thus be likely to cooperate with United States forces
in the immediate future to a void interference with his sources of
overseas supply. Rear Admiral Jones should capitalize upon this
predisposition of Salvaje.
A landing of forces without warning would antagonize the
insurgents. They might cause property damage or kill United States
citizens before being driven off. But the insurgents should clearly
understand that the United States will land forces to protect the
lives and property of its citizens with or without the consent of
Cortez or Salvaje and there is a legal basis for this action. Salvaje
should be informed that the necessary force is on hand and can be
landed immediately. He should also be informed that if Almirante
Medina and Almirante Sidonia appear to cover withdrawal of the
PDS troops, and the property of United States citizens is destroyed
during this 'vithdrawal as a diversion, the ships will be captured and
returned to the Cortez government pursuant to the Convention on
the Rights and Duties of States in the llvent of Oivil Strife. 82
Salvaje should be informed that if United States citizens are
uninjured and their property unharmed, our forces will neither
interfere with nor support his withdrawal nor will we undertake
to inform Cortez forces the withdrawal is occuring. If Salvaje
indicates he will persist in his plan to burn the lu1nberyards and
Emaltacion, the marines should be landed in the force required to
s1 Modelski,
s2

The International .Relations of Internal War, 6 (1961).

46 Stat. 2749 ( 1929-31) .
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evacuate United States citizens to Eutaw Springs/ protect our consulate; and prevent if possible, or otherwise to minimize, damage
to the lumberyards. 83
D. SEIZURE OF PROPERTY BY DE JURE GOVERNMENT
Situation 4

Three hours after Rear Admiral Jones notified Salvaje the
United States was prepared to land forces to protect the lives and
property of its citizens, Almirante Medina arrived in Exaltacion,
took 75 insurgents on board, and proceeded along the Nuevan
coast through territorial waters to the east. The remaining Salvaje
forces evacuated Exaltacion during the night, moving by truck
east along the coast road. Cortez forces, attempting to intercept
this truck movement at Resistencia, were driven off by fire from
A.lmirante Sidonia.
Cortez units moved into Exaltacion in division strength this morning. The last units closed at 1000 hours.
At 1200 hours, Rear Admiral Jones is notified by United States
Naval Headquarters at Ooloso, Antioka, the Nuevan Ambassador
this morning presented to the Foreign Secretary an ultimatum that
Antiokan marines 'vho were landed last night on the south coast
of Nueva in the vicinity of the Luna Mountains be withdrawn within
twelve hours. All landings of supplies from Antioka in that area
must also cease 'vithin that time. Failure by Antioka to comply
with the terms of the ultimatum would result in full military and
naval action being taken against the Antiokan beachheads in Nueva
and against the territory and people of Antioka.
At 1730, Rear Admiral Jones receives a message :from the commander of Staton that the Cortez Army commander in Exaltacion
has taken the :following action : ( 1) His officers have boarded
Harp, West Wind and Cypress, :freighters owned by the Virginia
Pine Products Corporation and o:f United States registry. They have
in :formed the respective masters that their vessels have been seized
:for the duration o:f "the emergency." (2) The resident managers o:f
the lumberyards in Exaltacion have received written notice :from the
local Cortez Army headquarters that all lumber and machinery in
sa For additional material on the points considered, see Offut, The Protection
of Citizens Abroad by the Armed Forces of the United States (1928) ; I Hyde,
International Law, 245-281 (1947) ; Martin, The Policy of the United States as
Regards Intervention (1921). Problems in the diplomatic protection of nationals
are examined in Dunn, The Protection of Nationals (1932). Dunn examines the
use of force briefly in Chapter II.
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their yards are requisitioned, effective immediately, for military use.
They have been required to submit inventories within twelve hours
and periodic reports at intervals of twenty-four hours thereafter indicating stock levels.
In response to a message from Rear Admiral Jones our Charge
d'Affaires in Dolores reports the Cortez Government has ordered a
general mobilization. He is unable to determine the intentions of
Cortez concerning requisitions or expropriations of property and
cannot determine what orders, if any, have been issued to the Cortez
Army commander in Exaltaci.on.
The masters of Harp, West Wind and Oypress and the managers
of the lumberyards are to board Staton at 2100 for a conference
concerning the action of the local Army commander.
The Captain of Staton requests instructions concerning the position of the United States naval force with respect to these events and
requests also instructions concerning information which should be
given the masters and managers at the scheduled conference. The
staff of Rear Admiral Jones is considering the request of the Captain
of Staton. What instructions should he be given?
Discussion: Situation 4

Types and Methods of Expropriation
The property of aliens may be expropriated by many methods.
The method may be indirect, as by a confiscatory tax or a devaluation of currency. The method may be direct, as a taking of property
by judicial process to construct a highway.
The taking may be "individualized," such as seizure of a particular business enterprise, usually called "expropriation." It may
be "collective," such as a seizure of all industries of a particular
type, often called "nationalization" or "socialization."
The alien may be compensated for his loss. However, most expropriations are confiscatory. No compensation is offered, the compensation is grossly inadequate, or the loss is not compensable.
Examples of confiscatory expropriations are fines, imposed as a
sanction to support enforcement of laws; seizure, and destruction or
sale, of weapons, vessels or products used in the commission of
crimes; and abatements of nuisances, such as destruction of diseased
or offensive animals and destruction or denials of use of unsafe
structures.
These and many other forms of expropriations occur in all states,
including the United States. This country has recognized a similar
expropriatory authority in other states, subject to an international
legal minimum standard of conduct.
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The international legal standard in the view of the United States
'vas expressed succinctly by Secretary of State Hughes in 1923 to
the Norwegian Foreign Minister. The United States, during World
War I, had requisitioned Norwegian construction contracts, materials
and completed vessels.
Following the war the Norwegian claims were arbitrated. The
arbitral tribunal awarded a large sum to Norway. But in the opinion
of United States officials the tribunal had gone beyond the terms
of submission. A particular ground of objection was the decision by
the tribunal that a belligerent could not define the extent and
termination of an emergency. The United States promptly paid the
award, but Secretary Hughes in his cover letter wrote in part: 84
* * * It is the view of this Government that private property
having its situs within the territory of a State, * * * including
as in the present case property produced or created therein
and never removed therefrom, ·is from the standpoint of international law subject to the belligerent needs of the territorial
sovereign quite regardless of the nationality of the owners,
provided that in case of its requisition just compensation be
made. Due process of law applied uniformly and without discrimination to nationals and aliens alike and offering to all just
terms of reparation or reimbursement suffices to meet the requirements of international law; and thus the requisitioning
state is free to determine the extent and duration of its own
emergency. * * *
The requisitions discussed by Secretary Hughes occurred during
war. The property of a "neutral" was taken. However, requisitions
are proper in any emergency for an apparent public use if the
conditions described by Secretary Hughes are met.
Summary takings of property are characteristic of national and
international emergencies. No extensive formalities or hearings need
precede this type of expropriation if thereafter an adequate opportunity is provided the owner by the expropriating state to secure
compensation or reparation.
The requisition must be nondiscriminatory. The requisition policy
must apply to nationals and aliens alike. Aliens must bear the brunt
if they possess 'the only kind of property needed by the expropriating
state.
Requisitions of property of aliens when the property is temporarily
within the territory of the expropriating state and the alien is not
a resident of the state have presented special difficulty. For example,
alien property may be seized while in transit through the territory.
84

II Foreign Relations of the United States, 627 ( 1923).
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A vessel is usually taken within the territorial waters of a state
for a transient purpose, such as loading or unloading cargo.
The tendency in cases of this type is to insist upon strict procedural
safeguards before seizure. A clear showing of a major emergency is
expected. The application to public use must be certain. Prompt and
adequate compensation is demanded.
"When the property temporarily within the expropriating state
has been derived from local resources or when the property was not
derived from local resources but the owner is a resident alien, the
stringent requirements of the "transient property" rule may be
relaxed.
.Angary
Seizure of vessels temporarily within territorial waters of the
expropriating state has been discussed by publicists both as an
exercise of the "Right of Angary" and as a "requisition."
Before the 18th century, particularly during the Middle Ages,
various rulers claimed a jus angariae. 'fhe idea of nationality of a
ship or its owner was not then clearly delineated. The obligation
of a sovereign to protect his own subjects in the territory of another
ruler was ill-defined.
An alien at this time was regarded as a privileged subject of the
ruler in whose territory he resided. The alien had correlative obligations in return for the special royal protection to which he was
entitled.
Alien vessels thus could be prevented from leaving port in the
royal discretion. (.Arret de Prince.) Their crews could be impressed.
Ancient English kings, for example, constantly traveling between
England and their lands on the Continent, pressed into service any
suitable vessel which could be located 'vhen passage was desired.
Jus angariae was utilized in the conduct of routine royal business
and pleasure. Compensation for the forced use often was rendered. 85
The modern relation of "angary" to "war" stems from several
sources. Efforts in the Hague Conventions and Regulations to circumscribe the power of requisition were influential. Angary has
85 For a typical statement of the ancient and modern rights of angary and a
confusion of these with the modern practice of requisition, see II Oppenheim,
International Law, 759-766 (7th Ed., 1952) ; Bullock, "Angary" 3 Brit. Y.B. Int.
L., 99 (1922-23). Bullock states at 3 Brit. Y.B. Int. L., 122: "* * * [I]t is of the
essence of true right of angary that it shall be a requisition of means of transport for purposes of transport." A sinking of ships would not be a case of
angary. Bullock also declares angary a right of sovereignty which cannot be
exercised in occupied enemy territory. He regards the right as extending to all
means of transport, sea, air and land.
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been discussed extensively in cases concerning assertion o£ the right
against uncondemned vessels and property in the hands o£ prize
courts during war. The most important £actor, unquestionably, has
been the disproportion between the peace and war needs o£ a state
£or ocean shipping. The supply o£ a modern army places extraordinary demands upon the ocean shipping o£ any state. The
capacity o£ an enemy £or destruction o£ shipping in modern war outstrips the friendly capacity £or construction. Consequently, control is asserted over all vessels other than those o£ allies useful for
military and civilian transport.
A right o£ requisition o£ foreign vessels by a de jure government
of a state seems recognized in any major emergency. The so-called
"modern right o£ angary'~ no longer extends to the impressment o£
seamen. It is limited to the seizure o£ vessels qr other means o£
transport. Consequently, i£ angary has any moqern relevance, tied
as it seems currently to a state o£ war, this relevance must be to
seizures o£ vessels or other means o£ transport by insurgents.
As applied to insurgent seizures, angary can have currently no
major importance. For example, a state 'vhich extends belligerent
recognition to insurgents cannot later look to the de jure government
£or compensation £or insurgent exercises o£ a right o£ angary against
their vessels. But absent this belligerent recognition, the obligation
o£ the de jure government to compensate £or insurgent seizures is
questionable and compensation is seldom made.
Therefore, today, it seems preferable to deal with seizures o£
vessels simply as requisitions. 86 As indicated by Secretary Hughes, 87
the usual practice is to permit the requisitioning state to determine
the degree o£ emergency. Compensation will be demanded whether
the emergency is great or small, real or imagined. The state o£ the
alien whose property was taken may insist upon stricter procedural
safeguards when the property is transient. Procedural preconditions
to taking the property might be demanded i£ in the judgment o£
the state o£ the alien the gravity o£ the emergency was slight. The
law o£ "angary" supplies few useful guidelines.

International Agreements 0 oncerning Expropriations
Since not only requisitions during emergencies but expropriations
Bullock, who rejects the relationship of angary to war or military necessity,
and applies the doctrine to seizures of means of transport to be used for transport, may lay the basis for an argument that due to the general community
interest in transport a special legal regime should apply to interferences with
it. The argument would be stronger if angary could be said to embrace communications facilities as well. See Bullock, op. vit.
87 See Fn. 84, supra.
86
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of all types have become common practice, especially among new
states or in states which have undergone revolutionary change, these
expropriations typically being confiscatory, attempts have been made
to protect the interests of aliens by treaty. Perhaps the most
ambitious attempt towards this end in a multilateral convention was
the Economic L1greement of Bogota, one of a number of agreements reached at the Bogota Conference of 1948. 88
Article 22 of this Agreement provides equitable treatment for
foreign capital. Article 24 reaffirms that foreign capital should be
subject to national laws and measures might be taken to insure that
it was not used to intervene in the politics or prejudice the security
or "fundamental interests" of the receiving state.
Article 25 recited:
The States shall take no discriminatory action against investments by virtue of which foreign enterprises or capital may
be deprived of legally acquired property rights, for reasons or
under conditions different from those that the constitution or
laws of each country provide for the expropriation of national
property. Any expropriation shall be accompanied by fair compensation in a prompt, adequate and effective manner.
The United States pressed unsuccessfully for inclusion of a provision such as Article 25 in the Charter of the International Trade
Organization, considered at Havana shortly before the Bogota Conference. The Havana Charter was not ratified by a sufficient number
of states to come into force. This proved to be the fate also of the
Economic Agreement of Bogota.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, developed as a
substitute for the Havana Charter, after it became apparent that the
latter would never be ratified, did not deal with the rights of
individuals. There were no provisions concerning direct expropriations.
In bilateral treaties and executive agreements with many states,
the United States has dealt specifically with expropriation problems.
In the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Right8
of 1958 made with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, superseding a
treaty made in 1833, the following typical provision appears :89
1. Each Party shall at all times accord fair and equitable
treatment to nations and companies of the other Party, and to
ss X Documents on American Foreign Rela.tions, 516 (1948). For a comment
on the Agreement with a critical appraisal of the many confusing reservations
made by the parties, see Lockwood, "The Economic Agreement of Bogota," 42
A.J.I.L., 611 (1948) ; 18 Department of State Bulletin, 308 (1948).
8911 U.S. Treaties (Part II, 1960) 1836.
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their property and enterprises, and shall refrain from applying
unreasonable or discriminating 1neasures that would impair their
legally acquired rights and interests.
2. Property of nationals and companies of either Party, including direct and indirect interests in property, shall receive
all possible protection and security within the territories of the
other Party. Such property shall not be taken except for a
public purpose, nor should it be taken without prompt payment
of just compensation. Such compensation shall be in an effectively realizable :form and shall represent the full equivalent
of the property taken; and adequate provision shall have been
made at or prior to the time of taking for the determination
and payment thereof. * * *
Analogous provisions are not inserted in executive agreements
with mutual security program countries. However, these agreements
do set forth procedures for settling claims for losses resulting from
the occurrence of risks subject to guarantees under the Mutual
Security Acts. There is an implication that compensation will be
demanded by the United States or may be awarded by an arbitral
tribunal.
The United States, and many other countries, have treaties
regulating the requisitioning of vessels temporarily within the
waters of the requisitioning states. Some of the older treaties, such
as the Treaty of 1785 between the United States and Prussia,90
prohibit requisitions. The more recent treaties admit the propriety
of the requisitions and stipulate the measure of compensation.91
Modern conventions bearing upon the conduct of hostilities, including the Hague Conventions of 1907 92 and the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949, contain provisions applicable both to requisitions and contributions. The contribution is a greneral levy, in
effect a special tax, which is usually pecuniary in nature but which
may be in kirnd.
Hague Convention IV imposes extensive restrictions upon the
authority of a military occupant in hostile territory over private
90
91

II Malloy, 1482.
For a collection and analysis of a number of these treaties, see Harvard

Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial
War, 31 A.J.I.L., Supp. 2 (1936); U.S. Naval War College, International Law
Situations, 1926, 65-87.

The Hague Conventions of 1907 were an amplification of the Regulations
attached to Hague Convention II of 1899 with respect to the law and customs
of war on land and Hague Convention III of 1899 adapting to maritime warfare principles of the Geneva Convention of 1864 for amelioration of the condition of the wounded.
92
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property within its power. Private property cannot be confiscated.9a
Requisitions must be proportioned to the resources of the country. 94
Contributions must adhere so far as possible to the rules of assessment and incidence of taxes. 95 Proper orders and receipts are required for levies of both types. 96 Communications and transport
equipment and weapons and ammunition may be seized but must be
restored or paid for when peace is made.97
Provisions in Hague Convention IV, relative to requisitions of
private property, are amplified by the 1949 Geneva O.onvention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persom in Tilme of War. 98
This Convention sets forth a number of requirements for minimum
physical safety and well-being which apply to the entire populations
of countries in military conflict. Hague Convention IV is not equally
broad.
However, the only broad provision of the Geneva Convention with
possible relevance to requisitions imposes an obligation upon contracting parties to allow free passage of medical and hospital stores,
objects necessary for religious worship, and clothing and tonics
intended for children under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases. 99 These items cannot be captured or requisitioned in
transit.
The remaining protected categories of persons in the Geneva
Convention include those "who * * * find themselves, in case of a
conflict * * *, in the hands of a Party to the conflict * * * of which
they are not nationals." 100 While these categories are also broader
than those included in Hague Convention IV, persons are not in
the Geneva categories unless the states of which they are nn,tionals
are parties to the Convention and lack normal diplomatic relations
with the state in conflict.
Subject to these limits to the categories of proteoted persons in
36 Stat. 2277, Art. 46 ( 1909-1911) .
Ibid., Art. 52.
95 Contributions are pecuniary assessments or assessments in kind which are
imposed generally.
oo 36 Stat. 2277, Arts. 51, 52.
97 Ibid., Art. 53.
98 6 U.S. Treaties 3516 (1955).
99 Ibid., Art. 23. This obligation is qualified by the condition that the party
in conflict or occupying a hostile territory "is satisfied that there are no serious
reasons for fearing": that the consignments will be diverted; ineffectively controlled; or that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or
economy of the enemy through substitutions. It is probable that any effective
operation of the Article is eliminated by the imposition of these conditions. The
matter is discussed in greater detail in Chapter V.
too Ibid., Art. 4, 11.
93
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the Geneva Convention, pillage of and reprisals against the property of private individuals are prohibited both in the territory of
a party to the conflict and in terri tory under hostile military
occupation. 1() 1
There is no prohibition of requisitions of labor and services of
aliens in the territory of a party to the conflict, but the alien is
placed upon the same basis as a national of the party with respect
to wages, working conditions and hours. 102 If restrictive measures
have been taken against the alien's property, such as "vesting"
pursuant to a Trading With the Enemy Act, the measures must be
"cancelled" in accordance with the law of the Detaining Power as
soon as possible after the close of hostilities. 103 It is not clear that
the "restrictive measures" contemplate "requisitions," although it is
arguable that requisitions are included.
Within occupied territories, the occupying state can requisition
the services of protected persons over the age of eighteen necessary
for the needs of the army of occupation, public utility services, and
for feeding, sheltering, clothing, transporting or maintaining the
health of the population of the occupied territory. The protected
person must be paid a fair 'vage and his work must be proportionate
to his physical and intellectual capacities. 104
Foodstuffs and medical supplies may not be requisitioned except
for use by the occupation forces and administrative personnel and
then only after the requirements of the civilian population are taken
into account.l 05 Arrangements are to be made to ensure that fair
value is paid for any requisitioned goods.l 06
Civilian hospitals may be requisitioned only temporarily and
then only in cases of urgent necessity for the care of the wounded
and sick. The material and stores of civilian hospitals cannot be
requisitioned so long as they are necessary for the needs of the
civilian population. 107 Relief supplies may not be diverted except in
cases of urgent necessity in the interests of the population of the
occupied territory and then only with the consent of the Protecting Power. 108
Ibid., Art. ~3.
Ibid., Art. 40.
103 Ibid., Art. 56.
104 Ibid., Art. 51.
105 Ibid., Art. 55.
106 The requirement is "Subject to the provisions of other international Conventions" but this limitation seems to require nothing more than adequate receipt with compensation made in the future.
101 6 U.S. Treaties 3516, Art. 56 (1955).
1os Ibid., Art. 60.
1o1
1o2
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Protected persons, who are interned, present no special requisition
problems, although the Convention prohibits their forced labor,
except for medical personnel in a professional capacity; administrative and maintenance work in the places of internment, including
kitchen and domestic tasks; and duties connected with protection
against aerial bombardment or other war risks. Provision is made
for payment of wages. 109 If the property of an internee is withheld upon his release or repatriation by virtue of laws of the detaining power, he must receive a detailed receipt.
The extensive destruction and appropriation of property not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly is said to be a grave breach of the Convention. 110 This
would not, of course, preclude requisitions of property of protected
persons, even though on a large scale, if done upon regular orders
and with a provision for immediate or reasonably delayed compensation.
Hague Convention V (Respecting the Rights and Duties of
Neutral Powers and Persons in Oase of lVar on Land) permits
the necessary requisition of railway material belonging to a neutral
by a belligerent with a restriction that the material must be sent
back to the country of origin as soon as possible.l 11 Compensation
must be paid in proportion to the material used and the period of
usage.
Difficulty 'vas experienced at the Hague Conference of 1907 in
formulating this provision. There was considerable opposition at
the time to any requisitions of neutral property by a belligerent.
The right was finally recognized but limited to cases of imperative
necessity .112
Major General von Gundell of the German Delegation advocated
the inclusion of a right of requisition of railway material. He distinguished in argument the slight injury which a state would sustain
by returning neutral vessels from the great injury by dislocation of
its transportation system which would result from an immediate
return of railroad equipment. 113

Ibid., Art. 98. The Detaining Power must~ open a regular account for every
internee. Art. 95. Wages for work done are determined on an equitable basis by
special agreements between internees, the Detaining Power or employers other
than the Detaining Power. Internees in the categories whose services may be
requisitioned must be paid "fair wages" by the Detaining Power.
no Ibid., Art. 147.
11136 Stat. 2310, Art. 19 (1909-1911).
11 2 U.S. Naval War College, International Law Situations, 1926, 66.
113 Ibid., 67-68.
109
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Hague Convention IX (Respecting Bombardment by Naval Forces
in Time of War) permits bombardment of an undefended town :
* * * if the local authorities, after a formal summons has been
made to them, decline to comply \vith requisitions for provisions
or supplies necessary for the immediate use of the naval force
before the place in question.
The requisitions in such a case must be in proportion to the
resources of the place, must be demanded in the name of the commander of the naval force, and must either be paid for or evidenced
by receipts. 114 There is no authority to bombard for failure to pay
money contributions. 115
Both the 1929 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Oond£tion .of the lVo?J;nded and Sick of Armies in the Field 116 and
the Geneva Convention of 1949 on the same subject,117 the latter
Convention superseding the former for the United States, contained provisions for the temporary requisition of medical and
sanitary personnel, equipment and buildings. These requisitions are
limited to cases of urgency and contemplate both limited use of
the personnel and equipment, and restitution with reasonable promptness rather than compensation. These requisitions, however, are of
privileged persons and property. The Convention cannot be taken
as establishing for all purposes principles bearing upon the requisition of property of nonprivileged character.
The only provisions in any of the Conventions explicitly applicable to civil wars are included as "common" Article 3 in each of
the Geneva Conventions of 1949. "Common~' Article 3 establishes
minimum standards of physical treatment of persons. The Article
contains nothing concerning requisitions of property. It is stated in
this Article that parties to the internal conflict should endeavor to
bring into force by special agreements all or part of the provisions
of the Conventions.
The Hague Conventions contain a "general participation" clause.
The "general participation" clause states, in effect, that the particular Hague Convention is inapplicable unless all the belligerents
are parties to the Convention.
Unless the combatants agree to apply their terms, the Hague
Conventions qannot be applied directly to a civil war. Nor can the
11436 Stat. 2351, Art. 3 (1909-1911).
115 Ibid., Art. 4.
116 47 Stat. 2074 ( 1931-1933).
117 6 U.S. Treaties 3114 (1955). The Geneva Convention of 1929 is still technically in force between the United States and those states which have not
ratified the Geneva Convention of 1949 but were also parties to the earlier
treaty.
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Geneva Conventions be applied directly except to the extent stated
in "common" Article 3.

Applying Principles of International Agreements
As "Internati.onal Custom"
It is possible, ho·wever, that these Conventions, taken as a group,
now express accepted principles of the customary law of war which
might be applied to a civil disturbance under special circumstances.
During World War II, for example, Russia was a party to Hague
Convention IV. T ·wo of the belligerents, Bulgaria and Italy, were
not. Russia, on the other hand, had never become a party to the
Geneva Convention of 1929 concerning treatment of prisoners of
war. The Nuremberg Tribunal for the Trial of Major War Criminals
nevertheless held Germany bound in its relations with the Soviet
Union by a customary la.w of "\varfare which these Conventions were
said to reflect. Thus, with respect to Hague Convention IV, the
Tribunal ruled: 11 8
* * * The rules of land "\Yarfare expressed in the Convention
undoubtedly represented an advance over existing international
law at the time of their adoption. But the Convention expressly
stated that it was an attempt 'to revise the general laws and
customs of war,' which it thus recognized to be existing, but
by 1939 those rules laid do,vn in the Convention were recognized
by all civilized nations, and 'vere regarded as being declaratory
of the laws and customs of war which were referred to in Article
6 (b) of the Charter.
With respect to the Geneva Convention of 1929 on the treatment
of prisoners of war, the Tribunal cited with approval a statement by
Admiral Canaris protesting the departures in treatment of prisoners
from settled customs dating from the 18th century .119 In the "High
Command Case," 120 the United States Military Tribunal applied
this rationale, remarking upon the approval of the Canaris statement by the International Military Tribunal: 121
It would appear from the above quotation that the Tribunal
accepted as international la "\V the statement of Admiral Canaris
to the effect that the Geneva Convention was not binding
between Germany and Russia as a contractual agreement but
ns I International Military Tribunal (N1uremberg) Trial of the, Major War
Criminals, 253 (1947).
119 Ibid., 232.
120 United States of America v. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. (Case No. 12) Nuremberg Military Tribunals, X, XI Trials of War Criminals (1950).
121. Ibid., XI, 534.

203
that the general principles o:f international law as outlined in
this Convention 'vere applicable. In other words, it would appear
that the IMT in the case above cited :follo·wed the same line o:f
thought with regard to the Geneva Convention as with respect
to the Hague Convention to the effect that they were binding
insofar as they were in substance an expression o:f international
law as accepted by the civilized nations o:f the world, and this
tribunal adopts that viewpoint.
The Geneva Conventions o:f 1949, like the Conventions o:f 1929
applied by the Nuremberg Tribunals, contain no "general participation" clause. I:f one o:f the parties to a conflict is not also
a party to the Conventions, the Conventions nevertheless remain
binding upon the parties to it in their mutual relations.
The Conventions likewise apply in any armed conflict which
arises between two or more o:f the parties, with or without recognition o:f a state o:f war. 122 The trend in scope o:f the Conventions has
been since 1907 to·wards a progressively broader application o:f their
obligations to various stages and conditions o:f armed conflict.
The provisions o:f the Conventions 'vith respect to requisitions
have, on the other hand, been :fairly static. The Conventions o:f 1907
marked two major changes in principle :from the customary doctrine
existing at that time.
These changes were that a requisition must be necessary :for the
needs o:f the military :force or :for administration o:f an occupied
territory and must be proportioned to the resources o:f the people
o:f the country upon 'vhom it is imposed. In addition to these
:features, which should now be regarded as established in custom,
requisitions o:f private property require: ( 1) Orders in regular ..
:form by a major commander, to ensure that the requisition is necessary :for a public purpose and to fix responsibility; and either (2)
payment in cash :for the articles or services requisitioned or ( 3)
acknowledgement by a receipt ·with a subsequent payment in cash as
soon as possible. 123
E.g., 6 U.S. Treaties 3114, Art. 2 ( 1955). This provision is common to the
four Geneva Conventions of 1949.
123 A requisition which is proper under international law when made becomes
improper if no adequate compensation is tendered within a reasonable time. See
Goldenberg v. Germany, Annual Digest (1927-28) Case No. 369; Karrrwtzucas v.
Germany, Annual Digest (1925-26) Case No. 365. The principle was also applied
following World War II. See Case of Phillippe Rust, 9 War Crimes Trials, 71
(1949); Secret v. Loizel, Annual Digest (1943-45) Case No. 164. The compensation to be paid is not necessarily the market price at the time of requisition but
a fair price under the circumstances. II Oppenheim, International Law, 412
(7th Ed., 19G2).
122
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The trend to·wards expanding the application of the Conventions,
coupled with consistency throughout all of the Conventions in the
statements concerning legal conditions for the requisition of private
property, appears to support an argument that these requisition
principles are recognized today as pa1t of the customary la'v of war
and, under appropriate conditions, might be applied in a civil
disturbance.
The aptness of application of the customary doctrine of requisitions as expressed in the Conventions to a civil disturbance may be
appreciated ·when it is recognized that these provisions are no
longer of n1ajor significance for potential application to a general
military conflict fought 'vith modern we a pons and tactics. Both
requisitions and contributions have been said by publicists to be
based upon the "eternal" principle that ·w ar must support war. 124
The enduring and pervasive character of this principle is no'v open
to question.
A major destruction of the resources of a country, familiar during
World vVar II, and assured in any future major conflict in any
reasonably predictable form, places an invading military force
under the necessity of supplying a civilain population rather than
requisitioning its remaining slender resources. The problems are
those of employing a civilian population which seeks employment,
rather than of requisitioning its services; of supplying medical and
hospital items for civilian use, rather than of seeking them for
military use; and of providing civilian shelter rather than of
diverting it for use in quartering troops. The United States, after
'Vorld War II, 'vent to lengths to revive and rehabilitate its former
-:-enemies to fill a po,ver vacuum. The defeated states were not required
to pay the cost of the successful military operations.
Requisitions on any appreciable scale are likely to be made during
the conduct of actual military operations against an enemy rather
than during military occupation of hostile territory. Regulating the
latter regime ",.as of major concern at both the Hague and Geneva
Conferences.
During military operations, the trend is likely to be towards
requisitions of services necessary for area damage control and maintenance of essential public utilities. The officers ordering such requisitions will probably be small unit commanders. The conditions
of requisition may be such that receipts or payment ,vill be neglected.
The services, involving as they 'vill a high degree of hazard, will
be difficult to value. Food and other articles which are easily contaminated by fission products and difficult to decontaminate will be
1 24

II Oppenheim, International Law, 408 (7th Ed., 1952).
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carefully avoided by military forces to reduce the exposure o£
personnel to radiation. The quartering procedures followed during
former conventional wars 'vill be abandoned to avoid concentrations o£ troops and their exposure to attack by ultradecisive weapons.
The requisitioning provisions o£ the Hague and Geneva Conventions
will thus quite probably have limited application in a major war.
The principles expressed in these Conventions may nevertheless
be applicable to limited wars in 'vhich ultradecisive weapons are
not used. These wars may be o£ an international or internal nature.
Small units, such as guerrilla bands, may be difficult to locate and
supply. When located, efforts to supply them may disclose their
positions to the enemy.
These guerrilla units must then live by requisitioning food,
medical supplies, shelter and services £rom the local population. An
insurgent army, as in Nueva, its supplies curtailed £rom other
sources, will depend heavily upon requisitions. A de jure government
may requisition supplies to deny them to the insurgents or to compensate £or dislocations in its supply system produced by the insurgency.
The future viability o£ the Hague and Geneva principles concerning requisitions will thus depend largely upon their adaptability
either to limited international wars £ought to an appreciable extent
with small detached units, typically guerrilla warfare, or to insurgencies in which a status o£ belligerency has not been recognized.
In hostilities o£ this nature, the conception that "war must support
war" still prevails.
Can the principles o£ the Conventions concerning requisitions be
applied as part o£ the customary law o£ 'var to an insurgency, as
in Nueva? The belligerent status o£ the insurgents has not been
recognized by any government. The disturbance has not expanded
to a point at which a de facto state o£ belligerency can be said to
exist.
Most publicists have stated, or assumed, that the customary laws
o£ war are not applied to civil disturbances until the insurgents are
recognized as belligerents. 125 'I'hese publicists, however, h~ ve discussed in the context o£ their statements problems which, although
perplexing, are nevertheless narro'v in scope.
One o£ the most difficult o£ these problems has been delineation
o£ the circumstances under which a d,e jure government must treat
rebels as prisoners o£ "'"ar rather than subjecting them to summary
criminal processes as traitors. It is apparent that no amount o£
125 E.g., II Oppenheim, International Law, 209 (7th Ed., 1952) ; Department of
the Army, The Law of Land Warfare FM 27-10 (1956).
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belligerent recognition of the rebels by other states will go far to
prevent a de jure government, intent on crushing a rebellion by
terror, from applying the most stringent sanctions to its citizens. 126
Humane treatment may be granted to the rebels to obtain reciprocal
treatment of government personnel. But a de jure government will
seldom encourage a rebellion by expressly granting the rebels
belligerent recognition. Accordingly, efforts have been made to
divorce the requirement of humane treatment from belligerent
recognition, Judge Lauterpacht, for example, having written: 127
* * * As the law stands at present, a state which denies the
character and the rights of belligerents to insurgents who have
risen against it and who are in fact possessed of the attributes
of belligerency does not act contrary to a clear rule of international law. But it does -disregard the principles which underlie the law of war and which are in their essence independent
of the formal status of the parties to the struggle.
By contrast, a change in the regime of the high seas from one
of freedom of navigation to one in which interference with shipping
is tolerated, is keyed to nonrecognition or recognition of the belligerency of the interfering party. This has proven a realistic and
economical accommodation of the competitive needs of armed contestants with the commercial interests of peaceful "bystander"
states.
Belligerent recognition serves, functionally, as notice to the contestant of the "bystander's" claim to neutral privileges and to
citizens of the "bystander" that its neutrality laws apply. Belligerent recognition in this special context supports the element of
coordinated action among states which is the essence of public order.
While with respect to the recognizing "bystander" state, both the
de jure government and the insurgents may establish blockades
jure belli, enforce contraband lists, and visit, search and capture
vessels upon the high seas, whether the belligerent recognition is
eilJpressed or implied, these legal incidents are subordinate in
importance to the coordination of national and international law
and related activity \vhich belligerent recognition accomplishes.
It cannot be assumed, ho\vever, that belligerent recognition has the
same function of coordination in each context. Nor can it be assumed
that belligerent action upon the high seas, \vhile important, encompasses the total area of conflict within which the laws of war might
apply.
E.g., Trinquier, Modern Warfare, A French View of Counter-Insurgency
( 1964) passirn.
121 Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, 246 (1947).
126
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vVith respect to the property rights of its citizens in th e territory
of a state in civil conflict, recognition of a state of belliger ency
by a "bystander" state exonerates the de ju.re government from the
somewhat remote potential liability 'vhich it might have for damages
to the property caused by the insurgents. Functionally, belligerent
recognition in this context is supporting a system of order by a form
of 'vaiver, eliminating possible future sources of conflict by eliminating the potential liability of one possible party.
It has never been suggested, on the other hand, that the obligation of either the de jure government or the insurgents to receipt
or pay immediately for property requisition depended upon belligerent recognition. It has been pointed out in Situation 92 that,
absent belligerent recognition, "bystander" states have recognized
rights of the de jure government and insurgents to interfere with
their commerce within the territorial waters and on land of a state
embroiled in civil strife.
The propriety of seizures of property of a character not destined
for, and usable by, the opposing military force is in doubt 'vhen the
seizure is in territorial 'vaters rather than on land. But receipts or
payments are necessary and the customary law·s of ·warfare require
humane treatment of crews of the detained vessels.
A civil 'var is not ahvays conducted, as were the American and
Spanish Civil Wars, 'vith an increasing degree of intensity. Usually,
the strength of the insurgents 'viii advance and recede. The scope
of their activities 'viii increase and diminish. Their leaders 'viii
change and their political responsibility 'viii vary. The so-called
de facto state of belligerency of the insurgents 'viii 'vax and wane.
Insurgents who have been extended belligerent recognition by
another state may be reduced to the status and political responsibility
of bandits.
From the point of view of a "bystander" state, with respect to
requisitions of property of its citizens by either the de jure government or insurgents, it is reasonable to invoke the customary laws of
'var as expressed or influenced by the Hague and Geneva Conventions. There is no requirement that the "bystander" state, to seek
these minimum property safeguards, bring into operation its own
neutrality la,vs and expose itself to an exercise of belligerent rights
upon the high seas and to a possible charge of intervention by
recognizing either the belligerency of the insurgents or a "state"
of belligerency.

Application of Principles to Seizures by Nuevan Officials
The diplomatic practice of the United States recognizes the
expropriatory power of the de Jure government of a state which is in
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fact in physical control of a portion of its territory over all objects,
movable and immovable, found -within that portion, except property
owned by the United States. 128 For such public property the United
States may assert a claim of sovereign immunity.
The expropriation of the vessels and lumber by the de jure
government of Nueva may be founded upon a general right, such
as that usually asserted in general nationalizations of property,
often said to flow "from the sovereignty qf states over their internal
affairs.~' 129 As stated by Secretary of State Hull to the Mexican
Ambassador in 1939 : 130
My Government has frequently asserted the right of all
countries freely to determine their own social, agrarian and
industrial problems. This right includes the sovereign right
of any government to expropriate private property within its
borders in furtherance of public purposes.
The expropriation also may be founded upon a more particularized
power to seize property for public use in an emergency. This power
also has been recognized repeatedly by the United States. 131
With respect to the seizure of the three merchant vessels~ Harp,
West Wind and Cypress, it may be arguable that they are temporarily -within N uevan territorial \Vaters and have insufficient connection with the territory, and thus cannot be taken. 132 This position had some support in the law of "angary." It appears no longer
to be the practice under the modern law of requisitions applied in
World vVars I and II. The prevailing present opinion is that a
vessel may be requisitioned in an emergency if it enters port
voluntarily. 133
See Friedman, Expropriation in International Law, 134-135 (1953).
See White, Nationalization of Foreign Property, 4 (1961).
130 32 A.J.I.L. (Supp., 1938), 181, 182. Cited in 'Vhite, supra.
131 III Hyde, International Law, 1758-1772 (1947).
'
132 Friedman, for example, writes :
By customary international law the right of angary is excluded in certain
cases which clearly show that, being a variant of expropriation, it may only
be exercised in respect of property having a connection with the particular
territory. It has no application to ships in transit in foreign ports not to
ships under repair, but it does apply to ships which by their prolonged voluntary internment have finally become assimilated to the stable elements
in the particular territory which are subject to the State's territorial
sovereignty.
Friedman, Expropriation in International Law, 166 ( 1953) 0
133 The Harvard Draft Convention on the Right and Duties of Nerutral States
i n Naval and Aerial War accepts the element of "volitional" entry although it
is pointed out that agreement upon the point is not general. See 33 AoJ.loL.
(Suppo 2, 1939), 361, 3680 See Castren, The Present Law of lVar and Neutrality,
511 (1954) 0
12s
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British courts have permitted requisitions of vessels and property
seized on the high seas and brought in for adj udication. 134 The
Court of 1\::ing's Bench once permitted requisition of a neutral cargo
brought into a British port by a British vessel against the will of the
o'vner of the property .135
Injecting an element of volitional entry into the conditions for
requisition seems intended to preclude the practice of requisitioning
vessels brought into port ostensibly for a search when a search can
be conducted thoroughly and safely on the high seas. As pointed out,
there is no objection to requisitioning a vessel or cargo in the
custody of a prize court 'vhen there is a real issue to be tried and
the procedure is not a ruse to facilitate the requisition. 136
Volition cannot, on the other hand, be relied upon as the basis for
an effective argument to oppose requisitions. A few publisists take
the position that a vessel 'vhich enters a port in distress cannot be
requisitioned. 137 However, the emergency of the requisitioning state
might clearly outweigh the privilege of the victim driven in by
force majeure. There is scant authority upon which an exception for
distress may be based. 138 It may be possible to argue that only property voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the state can be
requisitioned. The argument might be extended by claiming immu134

The leading case is The Zamora ;1916/ 2 A.C. 77 in which a Swedish vessel
was brought in for search and then seized and subjected to adjudication on the
ground that it carried contraband copper destined for the enemy. While the case
was before the prize court, the Crown attempted to requisition the copper but
this was not permitted on the theory that there "was no real question to be
tried," so it would be improper not to order an immediate release. In addition to
this feature, which frustrated the requisition, the Privy Council stated that the
requisition of the vessel or goods must be needed urgently for defense or other
national security matters and the matter was, in any event, one for the courts
and not the executive to determine.
135 Commercial and Estates Company of Egypt v. Board of Trade /1925;
1 K.B. 271.
136 See The Zamora, Fn. 134, supra.
137 E.g., Friedman, Expropriation in International Law, 188-189 ( 1953).
138 In the Kate A. Hoff Case (United States v. j,J exico) Opinions of The
Commissioners, 174 ( 1929), Rebecca, an American ship, entered Tampico in distress. Her master was arrested for bringing goods into a Mexican port without
proper papers and was assessed triple damages against the merchandise on the
vessel. When he failed to pay, Rebecca and its cargo were sold under a court
order.
The Commission made an award in favor of the owners. Although the case
can be explained simply upon the principle that a vessel in distress is exempt
from the local customs laws, it may be argued that the case stands for the
broader proposition that a vessel in distress cannot be expropriated for any
reason.
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nity when the volitional entry was prior to the emergency or in ignorance of an existing emergency.
These arguments are tenuous and are significantly weakened by
the practice of requisitioning large numbers of idle vessels by the
United States, Britain and Italy during World War I and by the
United States and Britain in World War II. 139 It is not likely these
arguments will bear close judicial scrutiny or will appeal to an army
officer confronted by an insurrection, such as the one who has issued
the requisition order in Nueva.
At least one writer takes the position that the right of "angary"
or the right of requisition can be exercised upon the high seas. 140
The basis for this position is obscure. The few instances in which
such requisitions have occurred have given rise to no suggestion
that such a principle has been accepted by states. The statement
139 The United States, in 1918, requisitioned 87 Dutch vessels in American
ports and in 1917 requisitioned Norwegian ships building in American yards.
See Fn. 86, supra. England, France and Italy requisitioned Swedish and Dutch
vessels in 1918 under similar circumstances.
Four warships under construction in British shiprards for Turkey were
requisitioned by England while Turkey was neutral in 1914. The United States,
before its entrance into World War II, requisitioned idle vessels in American
waters. This was also done by other American republics.
50 U.S. Code 196 currently provides:
During any period in which vessels may be requisitioned under section
1242 of Title 46, the President is authorized and empowered through the
Secretary of Commerce to purchase, or to requisition, 0 t' for any part of
such period to charter or requisition the use of, or to take over the title to
or possession of, for such use or disposition as he shall direct, any merchant
vessel not owned by citizens of the United States which is lying idle in
waters within the jurisdiction of the United States, including the Canal
Zone, and which the President finds to be necessary to the National Defense.
Just compensation shall be determined and ' made to the owner or owners
of any such vessel in accordance with the applicable provisions of § 1242 of
Title 46. * * *
Section 1242 of Title 46 of the United States Code, which applies to vessels
owned by citizens, or under construction in the United States, and establishes
the scheme of compensation, establishes as a condition of time:
whenever the President shall proclaim that the security of the national
defense makes it advisable or during any national emergency declared by
proclamation of the President.
140 II Oppenheim, Internationa~ Law, 761, 765 (7th Ed., 1952). Fn. 3 at p. 761
points out that the almost unanimous opinion of writers is to the contrary.
Only two instances of .attempted requisitions have been reported. Helicon, a
Norwegian steamer, was halted in 1914 and coal requisitioned by a German
cruiser. PetroUte, an American steamer, had food requisitioned by an Austrian
submarine in 1915. In neither case were the requisitions claimed or admitted
to be consistent with international law.
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may be based upon the British practice of requisitioning vessels
and cargo during prize adjudications or when brought in for
search. 141
Most publicists assume merchant vessels in innocent passage
through territorial 'vaters may be requisitioned or subjected to the
right of "angary." This position also has little support in practice. 142
If the po,ver of a state to requisition property of aliens is subject
to any appreciable confines, some direct contact previously existing
between the state and the property taken must be required. It is
the essence of innocent passage that this contact, of an offensive
nature at any rate, is lacking.
The current absence of general agreement concerning the extent
of territorial waters, coupled 'vith claims of contiguous zones,
sometimes of an extravagant nature, may erode the doctrine that
property may not be requisitioned on the high seas. Assuming
requisitions may be made during emergencies, as determined by the
requisitioning state, the absence of a generally accepted test for
territorial seas may ultimately impose a heavy burden upon sea
commerce.

Suggested Solution: Situation 4
Upon the assumption Harp, West Wind and Oypress entered the
harbor of Ewaltacion voluntarily, not having been forced in by
Cortez or Salvaje naval units, the vessels, by the present United
States practice and accepted international legal principles, are subject to requisition by the Cortez government. There is no requirement
that the various conditions of the old la "r of "angary" be satisfied.
There must be an urgent requirement for use of the vessels in the
emergency. This, in accordance 'vith the United States position, is
determined finally by the requisitioning government. The vessels
must be within the jurisdiction of Nueva, which they clearly are.
There must be compensation. The services of the officers and crews
of these vessels cannot be requisitioned.
The principles applicable to requisition of the vessels are applicable to the lumber. The contact or connection between the lumber

Article 29 of the Declaration of London of 1909 suggests goods ser ving
exclusively to aid the sick and wounded may be requisitioned on the high sea s
although not treated as contraband of war. The Declaration of London is not
a treaty. The inference which may be drawn from Article 29 appears incompatible with the Hague and Geneva Conventions on the point. A detailed comment on the Oppenheim position appears in Colombos, The International Law of
the Sea, 508-510 (4th Ed., 1959).
142 E.g., Castren, Present Law of War and Neutrality, 511 (1954).
141
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and Nueva is clear. Fewer arguments can be developed to oppose
the action o:f the army commander.
Nationals o:f Nueva may be required to continue their work in the
yards. But the labor o:f United States citizens may be compelled
only to the extent necessary to protect the property :from loss or
injury during an orderly turnover and to secure orderly accounts
and inventories upon which a valuation o:f the property may be
based.
The naval :force will not, absent :further orders, intervene to prevent the requisitions, but 'viii report these acts by the Cortez Government and 'viii take measures to insure that the requirements o:f the
customary la,,s o:f 'var:fare are met in establishing the responsibility
o:f the Cortez Government :for the requisitions and the value o:f the
property taken.
These require1nents are that the local army commander issue
written orders in regular :form directing the seizures and that he
:furnish to the custodians o:f the property detailed 'vritten receipts
indicating the property requisitioned and the use :for 'vhich it was
requisitioned. Compensation or an agreement :for compensation will
not be required in advance, although a :fair compe1isation must be
paid within a reasonable ti1ne. The United States 'viii take action
other than military to insure that compensation is paid. Routine
procedures :for this purpose are probably established in the Treaty
o:f Friendship and Commerce bet,veen Nueva and the United States
and adequate sanctions to secure payment no doubt exist in :foreign
aid agreements to ,vhich the United States and Nueva are parties. 143
The case o:f requisition in regular :form by a de jure or de facto
government o:f a state is distinguishable :from a case o:f a threat to
property or lives when local la'v enforcement has broken down
and the government 'vould have doubtful responsibility :for damage
which United States citizens n1ight sustain.
In the latter case international governmental procedures cannot
be expected to operate 'vith sufficient speed to prevent or m1n1nnze
damage. This being the case, the individual state can act pending
143 See Fn. 89, supra. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 provides, for
example,
No assistance shall be provided under this Act to the government of any
country which is indebted to any United States citizen for goods or services
furnished, where such citizen has exhausted available legal remedies and
the debt is not denied or contested by such government.
Public Law 87-195, 87th Cong., 4 September 1961, section 620(c). The present
trend in foreign aid bills is towards prompt denials of aid to countries which
expropriate the property of United States citizens without adequate compensation. See Heffernan, New York Times, 10 June 1962, p. 1.
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action by an appropriate international governmental organization,
although action by such an organization should not be hindered or
impeded.
In the former case the responsibility of the requisitioning government is clearly established in international la\v as are procedures by
which compensation may be obtained. There is thus no need for
action other than to insure that the proper foundation for a claim
is laid. 144
Suggested references which develop in greater detail the problems raised
in Situation 4 are Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict, 436-441 (2d
Ed., 1959) ; II Oppenheim, International Law, 759-766 (7th Ed., 1952) ; III
Hyde, International Law, 1757-1772 (1947) ; Castren, Present Law of War and
Neutrality, 509-513 (1954) ; Colombos, Internat:ional Law of the Sea, 505-513
(4th Ed., 1959) ; McDougal and Feliciano, Law and Afini1num World Public
Order, 476 (Fn. 223), 818-824 (1961) ; Bullock, "Angary" 3 Brit. Y.B. Int. L.,
99 ( 1922-23) ; Feilchenfeld, The International Economic Law of Belligerent
Occupation, 32-46, 50-51 ( 1942) ; Lauterpacht, "Angary and Requisition of
Neutral Property," 27 Brit. Y.B. Int. L., 455 (1950). A thoughtful survey of
the problems of state responsibility involved and a draft convention on the
subject appears in Sohn and Baxter, "Responsibility of States for Injuries to
the Economic Interests of Aliens," 55 A.J.I.L., 545 ( 1961).
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